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A REASON TO DOUBT: THE SUPPRESSION 
OF EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCE OF 
INNOCENCE 
BY CYNTHIA E. JONES∗ 
The government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense 
under Brady v. Maryland has become one of the most unenforced 
constitutional mandates in criminal law.  The intentional or bad faith 
withholding of Brady evidence is by far the most egregious type of Brady 
violation and has led to wrongful convictions, near executions, and other 
miscarriages of justice.  This Article suggests that two ramifications should 
flow from intentional Brady violations.  First, courts should have the power 
to inform the jury of the government’s Brady misconduct by imposing a 
specially crafted punitive jury instruction.  Unlike the ineffective 
sanctioning scheme currently used to redress Brady violations, the 
proposed “Brady Instruction” could serve as a powerful deterrent against 
this virulent form of prosecutorial misconduct.  Second, under well-
established evidentiary principles, a litigant’s intentional suppression of 
relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the litigant’s case is weak 
and that the litigant knew his case would not prevail if the evidence was 
presented at trial.  The government’s intentional Brady misconduct falls 
within the scope of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.  Given 
that the government always has the burden of proof in a criminal case, 
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evidence that the government’s case is weak is relevant to whether the 
government can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Brady misconduct 
evidence also meets all other requirements for admissibility under the rules 
of evidence.  As such, the blanket exclusion of this evidence could infringe 
upon the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. 
I. INTRODUCTION
In a nationally televised press conference, the Department of Justice 
announced that a federal grand jury had returned a seven-count indictment 
against Alaska Senator Theodore “Ted” Stevens.1  The eighty-four-year-old 
Senator was charged with violating federal ethics laws by failing to disclose 
thousands of dollars in gifts and services received from constituents.2  After 
publicly announcing the charges, the Justice Department official thanked 
the lawyers in the Public Integrity Section, the division of the Department 
of Justice charged with investigating and prosecuting corruption by public 
officials.3  Ironically, the Public Integrity Section lawyers who investigated 
and prosecuted Stevens for nondisclosure of information would later face 
investigation and possible prosecution for obstruction of justice due to their 
own acts of nondisclosure of information.4  In fact, following the 
prosecutors’ repeated acts of concealing, altering, and falsifying critical 
evidence in the Stevens case, the trial judge rhetorically asked the 
prosecutors, “How does the court have confidence that the Public Integrity 
Section has public integrity?” 5 
Once the government initiated the criminal case against Ted Stevens, 
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland6 mandated that 
the trial prosecutors provide the defense with favorable information 
collected by the government during the course of its investigation, including 
information that either negated guilt or undermined the government’s case. 
The same constitutional principles of due process that compel the disclosure 
1 See DOJ Press Conference on Stevens’ Indictment (Fox News television broadcast July 
29, 2008); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference with Acting 
Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich on Indictment of U.S. Senator 3 (July 29, 
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/pin-stevens-pressconference 
transcript.pdf. 
2 Indictment, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1), 2008 
WL 284791. 
3 DOJ Press Conference on Stevens’ Indictment, supra note 1. 
4 Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4-5, 45-46, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 
177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 374). 
5 Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html. 
6 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
2010] A Reason to Doubt 417
of Brady evidence likewise prohibit the government from securing a 
conviction with false testimony or concealing the fact that such tainted 
evidence has been introduced at trial.7 
The crux of the criminal charges against Senator Stevens was that 
VECO, an Alaska-based company, performed extensive renovations on a 
home Stevens owned in Alaska.8  The government maintained that the free 
labor, building supplies, and related gifts bestowed upon Stevens totaled 
more than $100,000 over a seven-year period.9  The indictment alleged that 
Stevens violated the criminal penalty provisions of the federal ethics law by 
neither paying for these services nor reporting them as gifts when he filed 
his annual financial disclosure statement.10  Though it did not charge 
Stevens with accepting bribes, the indictment described Stevens’ 
relationship with VECO as a “scheme” to accept the free services while 
VECO was soliciting the Senator’s help with obtaining federal grants and 
seeking other federal government assistance with its foreign and domestic 
business matters.11  In defense, Stevens maintained that he paid for the 
renovation services and was unaware that he was not billed for the full cost. 
Stevens argued that he never knowingly submitted false financial disclosure 
statements.12   
As the Stevens litigation progressed, the government violated nearly 
every facet of the Brady doctrine.  In fact, their Brady violations grew in 
number and egregiousness throughout the trial.13  Specifically, the trial 
judge found that the government “used business records that the 
7 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
8 Indictment, supra note 2.  
9 Id. 
10 Specifically, Stevens was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006), which 
penalizes any person “within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch 
of the Government of the United States, [who] knowingly and willfully . . . makes any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.”  The statute was 
enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and requires every elected United 
States Senator to file a financial disclosure form every year they are in office.  The purpose 
of the filing requirement is to monitor and deter conflicts of interest.  Senators are required 
to disclose their income, assets, gifts, financial interests, and liabilities from the previous 
year, including gifts over $250 or $300, and liabilities in excess of $10,000.  Indictment, 
supra note 2. 
11 Indictment, supra note 2. 
12 Moreover, Stevens maintained that his wife directly oversaw the renovation project 
and had taken out a second mortgage to pay over $160,000 to VECO for the renovations, an 
amount they believed was the full cost of the services provided.  See Neil A. Lewis, Closing 
Arguments in Stevens Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A19, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/22stevens.html; Stevens Says, ‘I am 
innocent’ After Corruption Convictions, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Oct. 27, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/27/stevens.jurors/index.html. 
13 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
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Government undeniably knew were false,” suppressed “critical grand jury 
transcript[s] containing exculpatory information,” “affirmatively redacted” 
exculpatory content from documents, and provided the defense with a series 
of intentionally inaccurate document summaries.14  Moreover, when a 
prosecution witness flown in from Alaska made unanticipated exculpatory 
statements during a pretrial interview, the prosecutors secretly shipped him 
back to Alaska before the defense could subpoena him.15 
The Brady violations only intensified after Ted Stevens was found 
guilty on all counts.  Post-trial, the defense learned of a whistleblower 
complaint filed by an FBI agent assigned to the Stevens case.  When the 
defense petitioned the court to order the government to disclose the facts of 
the complaint, the prosecutors intentionally misrepresented to the court that 
the FBI complaint was unrelated to the Stevens verdict.  When the trial 
judge later learned that the FBI complaint involved allegations that the 
prosecutors had not turned over all evidence to Stevens’s defense team, the 
court ordered the prosecutors to disclose all evidence related to the FBI 
complaint to the defense.  When prosecutors repeatedly failed to comply 
with the court order, the trial judge held three prosecutors in contempt.16 
Thereafter, a new team of prosecutors was assigned to the Stevens 
case.  The new prosecutors quickly uncovered and disclosed what the trial 
judge called “the most shocking and serious Brady violations of all.”17  Bill 
Allen, the Chief Executive Officer of VECO, was the star witness for the 
prosecution.  Most of the Brady violations during the Stevens case involved 
information that either undermined Allen’s credibility or information from 
Allen and others that affirmatively exculpated Senator Stevens.  During the 
trial, Bill Allen admitted that he received a letter from Stevens requesting a 
bill for the renovation services.  Allen testified, however, that he was 
subsequently contacted by a Stevens emissary, Bill Persons, who indicated 
that the Senator was only sending the letter to create a false record to 
protect himself.18  This explosive revelation significantly bolstered the 
government’s allegation that Stevens schemed to cover up his financial 
windfall.  The government never informed the defense that, during a pretrial 
interview with the prosecutors, Allen stated that he did not recall having a 
 
14 Id.  
15 Senator Stevens’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment or For a Mistrial at 1-9, United States 
v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-231). 
16 See Minute Order, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (on 
file with author). 
17 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 6. 
18 Actually, the testimony was that Allen should not worry about getting the letter 
requesting the bill because “Ted is just covering his ass.”  Transcript of Motion Hearing, 
supra note 4, at 21. 
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conversation with Bill Persons regarding Ted Stevens’s bill.19  Allen’s 
inconsistent statement was memorialized in handwritten notes prepared by 
the trial prosecutors.20  Despite knowing that Allen’s pretrial statement was 
either powerful impeachment evidence or that Allen’s bombshell trial 
testimony was perjury, the prosecutors withheld their handwritten notes 
from the defense.   
In the end, the Stevens case collapsed under the weight of the Brady 
misconduct.  Newly appointed Attorney General Eric Holder took the 
extraordinary and virtually unprecedented step of requesting a 
postconviction dismissal of all charges with prejudice.21  The Stevens 
prosecution is significant, however, for three reasons.  First, unlike most 
criminal cases, when the Brady violations were discovered in Stevens, the 
prosecutor’s office took affirmative steps to repair the damage to the 
defendant and initiated its own internal investigation of the trial 
prosecutors.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, prosecutors face few, 
if any, adverse consequences for Brady violations either within their offices 
or from an outside entity with the power to address their misconduct.   
The Stevens prosecution is also notable because of the actions of Judge 
Emmet Sullivan who presided over the trial.  While applauding the Justice 
Department’s initiative in conducting an internal investigation of the Brady 
misconduct, the judge also noted that “the events and allegations in this 
case are too serious and too numerous to be left to an internal investigation 
that has no outside accountability.”22  For this reason, Judge Sullivan 
initiated criminal contempt proceedings against six of the Stevens 
prosecutors “based on failures of those prosecutors to comply with the 
Court’s numerous orders and potential obstruction of justice.”23  
 
19 Id. at 21-22. 
20 Id. at 24-25. 
21 Specifically, the Attorney General stated: 
I have concluded that certain information should have been provided to the defense for use at 
trial.  In light of this conclusion, and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances of this 
particular case, I have determined that it is in the interests of justice to dismiss the indictment and 
not proceed with a new trial. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding 
United States v. Theodore F. Stevens (Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2009/April/09-ag-288.html.  
22 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 46.  Judge Sullivan also remarked: “In 
nearly 25 years on the bench, I have never seen anything approaching the mishandling and 
misconduct I have seen in this case.”  James Oliphant, Prosecutors Now Target of Inquiry, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/08/nation/ 
na-stevens8. 
23 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 46.  The court acted pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, which also authorized the court to appoint an independent 
attorney to prosecute the case against the prosecutors.  This rule of procedure states, in 
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Commonly, when Brady violations are discovered—even when the 
violations are intentional and blatant—trial judges focus on curing any 
harm suffered by the defendant but fail to take punitive measures against 
the offending prosecutor to deter future Brady violations. 
Most significantly, the Stevens case is a sad testament to the relative 
ease with which overzealous prosecutors can manipulate evidence and 
finagle a guilty verdict in our American justice system.  Because the 
Stevens case was one of the most politically explosive cases of the decade,24 
there was intense media coverage.  Members of the press packed the 
courtroom, and an even larger group of photographers and camera crews 
were positioned outside the courthouse to provide daily reports on the trial.  
The intense media coverage ensured that the trial would be more public 
than the typical criminal case.  Also, the Stevens case was prosecuted by a 
team of veteran prosecutors from the premiere prosecution authority in the 
country and defended by a top-notch team of experienced and respected 
private defense attorneys.25  If multiple intentional Brady violations could 
occur under these conditions, it is not difficult to understand how Brady 
violations occur in run-of-the-mill criminal cases.  As Judge Sullivan stated 
upon dismissing the charges against Stevens, 
[t]he fair administration of justice . . . should not depend on who represents the 
[d]efendant, whether an FBI agent blows a whistle, a new administration, a new 
attorney general[,] or a new trial team.  The fair administration of justice depends on 
 
relevant part: “Any person who commits criminal contempt may be punished for that 
contempt after prosecution on notice. . . .  The court must request that the contempt be 
prosecuted by an attorney for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the 
appointment of another attorney.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2). 
24 Prior to being criminally charged, Stevens had served six terms in the U.S. Senate, 
winning re-election five times.  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s000888.  When the charges were 
filed in July 2008, Stevens was in the middle of re-election to his seventh term in office.  It 
was widely believed that he would almost certainly be re-elected.  Lewis, supra note 5.  
Even though the guilty verdict was announced less than two weeks before the election, he 
was only narrowly defeated by the democratic challenger, Mark Begich.  William Yardley, 
Senator Stevens Hanging by a Thread in Alaska as the Ballot Counting Continues, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at P17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/ 
06alaska.html.  As was widely speculated prior to the election, the loss of the “reliably 
Republican” Stevens seat had a far greater impact on the national political landscape because 
the Democratic Party was poised to (and did) win a powerful sixty-seat majority in the 
Senate, a feat that would not have been possible if Stevens had won re-election.  Alaska Sen. 
Ted Stevens Loses Re-Election Bid to Mark Begich, ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 18, 2008, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/11/alaska-sen-ted.html. 
25 Kim Eisler, Sen. Ted Stevens Hires Super-Lawyer Brendan Sullivan, 
WASHINGTONIAN.COM, July 1, 2007, http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/ 
capitalcomment/4457.html. 
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the Government meeting its obligations to pursue convictions fairly and in accordance 
with the Constitution.26 
Despite the nationwide epidemic of Brady violations and the 
magnitude of injustice that results from such misconduct, the criminal 
justice system has not developed effective reforms to provide a remedy for 
defendants or appropriately sanction prosecutors for concealing evidence 
favorable to the defense.  Even though the disclosure duty is violated 
regardless of whether the nondisclosure is negligent or intentional, the most 
egregious Brady violations occur when prosecutors purposely withhold 
information that they know is clearly and unquestionably favorable to the 
defense.  Shockingly, this level of willful misconduct—exemplified by the 
blatant arrogance of the Stevens prosecutors—is generally not met with 
harsh sanctions. 
This Article presents two alternative proposals to remedy and deter 
intentional Brady violations.  First, pursuant to the broad discretionary 
authority granted to courts to sanction Brady violations and other discovery 
misconduct, trial judges should redress intentional Brady violations with a 
strongly worded jury instruction.  The proposed “Brady instruction” would 
inform the jury that the government intentionally withheld evidence 
favorable to the defense and would permit the jury to consider the impact of 
the Brady misconduct as part of its deliberations.  While legal scholars have 
proposed the use of jury instructions to redress Brady violations, the 
instruction proposed here is designed to be a punitive sanction that would 
deter Brady violations by making the cost of Brady noncompliance too high 
for errant prosecutors. 
Alternatively, even if the trial judge does not elect to impose a Brady 
instruction sanction, the defense is entitled to adduce facts at trial to show 
that the government intentionally suppressed vital evidence favorable to the 
defense.  Under well-established evidentiary principles, the fact that a 
litigant has purposely withheld or destroyed key evidence gives rise to the 
inference that the litigant knows his case is weak and knows his cause will 
not prevail if the adverse evidence is presented at trial.  This “consciousness 
of a weak case” inference falls under the broad umbrella of relevant 
circumstantial evidence.  Applied in the context of intentional Brady 
violations, the defendant is entitled to show that the prosecutor—the person 
in the best possible position to assess the merits of the government’s case—
was conscious of the weakness of the government’s case and purposely 
withheld evidence that bolstered the defense or undermined the 
 
26 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 6-7.  Stevens’s lead defense lawyer, 
Brendan Sullivan, likewise lamented to the trial judge, “[A]s hard as you try to make it 
fair[,] . . . we are no match for corrupt prosecutors if they want to hide information known 
only to them or they want to present false testimony.”  Id. at 30. 
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government’s case.  In a criminal case in which the government always has 
the burden of proof, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference signals to 
the jury that the government’s case is compromised and can provide the 
jury with reasonable doubt.  Just as criminal courts have traditionally 
allowed the government to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt 
with evidence that the defendant attempted to suppress or destroy 
incriminating evidence, the government’s intentional Brady misconduct is 
likewise admissible to prove the prosecutor’s “consciousness of a weak 
case.”  Accordingly, the trial court’s exclusion of Brady misconduct 
evidence against the government is both counter to long-standing 
evidentiary principles and constitutes an arbitrary denial of a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in defense 
of criminal charges. 
Part II of this Article discusses the foundation and scope of the Brady 
doctrine and some of the complex litigation and reform issues that arise 
under the current state of the law.  Part III discusses the use of a Brady 
instruction as an appropriate sanction for the government’s intentional 
suppression of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence.  Part IV 
discusses the application of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference 
created by the intentional withholding of Brady evidence.  Part V applies 
both the Brady instruction sanction and the “consciousness of a weak case” 
inference to the case of United States v. Shelton.27 
II:  THE BRADY DOCTRINE 
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court stated that the role of 
the prosecution in the criminal justice system 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . .  [W]hile [the 
prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.28 
To that end, in Brady v. Maryland,29 the Court held that “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process when 
the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecutor.”30  The purpose of the Brady rule is to 
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial in which all relevant evidence 
of guilt and innocence is presented to enable the fact-finder to reach a fair 
 
27 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009). 
28 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
29 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
30 Id. at 87-88. 
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and just verdict.31  The Brady doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the 
trial prosecutor to investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable information 
located in the prosecutor’s files, as well as information in the possession of 
any member of the prosecution team.32  Recently, in Banks v. Dretke,33 the 
Court reiterated that the “essential elements” of a Brady claim are 
suppression of “favorable” and “material” evidence that results in prejudice 
to the defense. 
A.  “FAVORABLE” EVIDENCE 
The Brady disclosure duty is triggered by an initial determination that 
the government has evidence that is “favorable” to the accused.  The Court 
has held that “favorable” evidence includes both exculpatory evidence that 
negates guilt and impeaching evidence that undermines the government’s 
case.34  Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence are treated equally 
under the Brady doctrine.  According to a recent national report, most state 
and federal statutes and court rules designed to implement the Brady 
disclosure duty fail to delineate the different types of information subject to 
disclosure under Brady.35  As a result, the scope of the constitutional 
disclosure duty has been developed in the volume of state and federal court 
cases decided in the forty-five years since the Court’s decision in Brady. 
1.  Exculpatory Evidence 
Evidence is deemed to be exculpatory if it tends to negate guilt, 
diminish culpability, support an affirmative defense (duress, self-defense),36 
 
31 Id. 
32 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995). 
33 540 U.S. 668, 669 (2004). 
34 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1985). 
35 LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE 
COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES 12-14, 25-38 (2007) [hereinafter Brady Report], 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf.  
But see DIST. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2(A), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/ 
general/pdf/combined01.pdf (providing a definition for “exculpatory evidence”); DIST. OF 
KAN., GENERAL ORDER OF DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING, available at 
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/forms/index.php (listing specific categories of Brady evidence 
subject to disclosure); TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 23-24 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/ 
TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf (discussing various 
categories of Brady evidence). 
36 E.g., Arline v. State, 294 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (ordering new trial in self-
defense case where prosecution failed to disclose the weapon used by decedent during 
altercation); Branch v. State, 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (finding error where 
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or if the evidence could potentially reduce the severity of the sentence 
imposed.  The clearest example of exculpatory evidence is information 
uncovered during the criminal investigation indicating that someone other 
than the defendant committed the crime.37  Exculpatory evidence must be 
disclosed even if the prosecutor does not find the information credible or 
has other contradictory information.38  Exculpatory evidence includes third- 
party confessions, victim or complainant recantations, eyewitness 
identifications of another person as the perpetrator, as well as descriptions 
of the perpetrator that are inconsistent with the defendant’s appearance.39  
Also included is forensic evidence that affirmatively excludes the defendant 
as the culprit or fails to link the defendant to crime scene evidence 
(including physical evidence such as DNA, fingerprints, or bite marks).40  
 
defendant claimed self-defense to murder charges and gave uncorroborated testimony that 
the knife-wielding decedent aggressively attacked him immediately before the fatal 
encounter, prosecution suppressed evidence that a citizen gave police a knife purportedly 
belonging to the decedent that was found at or near the crime scene, and prosecutor argued 
in closing that there was no evidence to support the defense claim that the decedent was 
armed); Ex Parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (mandating a new trial 
where prosecution intentionally withheld a blood spatter expert’s report supporting the 
defense’s theory that the victim committed suicide).  
37 E.g., State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (involving a 
Brady violation where defendant charged with killing a police officer and prosecutor 
concealed fingerprint and ballistics tests, which showed that the gun used to kill the police 
officer was used in an earlier armed robbery committed by state’s chief witness). 
38 See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (“Even if 
the Assistant District Attorney ‘had valid reasons to consider this witness to be unreliable, 
[he] should nonetheless have provided the defense with this important exculpatory 
information which was clearly Brady material.’”  (quoting People v. Robinson, 133 A.D.2d 
859, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987))); People v. Springer, 122 A.D.2d 87, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986) (reversing the conviction and dismissing the indictment where prosecutor intentionally 
destroyed surveillance videos relevant to the sole critical issue even though the prosecutor 
claimed that he believed “the photographs showed nothing that would be of value in an 
identification procedure”). 
39 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 71 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding a Brady 
violation during prosecution of two African-American defendants where government 
suppressed witness statements describing perpetrators as two white males); see also cases 
cited infra note 44. 
40 See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (finding a Brady 
violation where prosecutor failed to timely disclose new blood test results revealing that the 
blood sample used to match defendant’s DNA to the crime was inconsistent with defendant’s 
blood); Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1991) (reversing capital murder conviction 
where government knowingly suppressed exculpatory FBI forensic report which had 
concluded that the hair sample used to connect the defendant to the victim was “not suitable 
for significant comparison purposes”); see also Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Roy 
Brown, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/425.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  At 
trial, the government introduced testimony of an expert witness that a bite mark on the 
victim’s body was “entirely consistent” with the defendant and suppressed the fact that 
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The government is also required to disclose evidence regarding the 
existence of other suspects who either have a modus operandi similar to the 
charged offense or who had the motive, means, and opportunity to commit 
the charged offense.41 
2.  Impeachment Evidence 
Impeachment evidence encompasses a broad range of information that 
would expose weaknesses in the government’s case or cast doubt on the 
credibility of government witnesses.  The Supreme Court has observed that 
“[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle 
factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a 
defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”42  Impeachment evidence is 
especially valuable in a case “when it impugns the testimony of a witness 
who is critical to the prosecution’s case.”43  Impeachment evidence includes 
any information regarding a witness’s prior convictions, biases, prejudices, 
self-interests, or any motive to fabricate or curry favor with the government.  
Impeachment evidence also consists of prior inconsistent statements of the 
witness and any prior failure of the witness to identify the defendant.44  The 
 
another expert had examined the bite mark before trial and excluded the defendant as the 
source.  Id.  
41 E.g., Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986) (reversing a murder conviction 
based on brutal rape and murder of small girl where government suppressed a police report 
discussing another suspect who was found in the woods near the body, had a red spot of 
blood on his shirt when interviewed by police, and who had the underwear of a small girl in 
his car); State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (reversing a 
conviction based in part on the failure to disclose existence of another prime suspect with a 
similar modus operandi who was seen at the scene of the crime on the night of the murder); 
Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that the government 
did not reveal the existence of a person who had a motive to kill victim and had threatened to 
kill victim shortly before her death). 
42 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
43 Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 
F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting habeas relief in murder case where state failed to disclose 
evidence that government’s star witness was known to be a “pathological liar” and a 
“prolific career burglar”); Cook, 940 S.W.2d at 625 (finding a Brady violation where 
government failed to disclose that witness was believed to be “mentally and emotionally 
unstable” and “a pathological liar”). 
44 E.g., Commonwealth v. Ellison, 379 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1978) (failing to disclose 
initial pretrial statements of co-defendants, which did not name the defendant as one of the 
participants in the crime and which contradicted their subsequent statements and trial 
testimony); State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding a 
Brady violation where prosecutor suppressed evidence showing that the only eyewitness to 
the crime specifically eliminated the defendant as the perpetrator during pretrial photo 
identification procedure); Texas v. Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) 
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government must also disclose information that casts doubt on the ability of 
the witness to accurately perceive, recall, or report the facts related to the 
witness’s testimony, including mental instability, substance abuse, memory 
loss, or any other physical or mental impairment.45 
In addition, Brady impeachment evidence includes any positive or 
negative inducements used to motivate a witness to testify on behalf of the 
government.  Inducements include promises, rewards, financial payments, 
and benefits, as well as threats, intimidation, and other forms of coercion 
used to secure testimony.46  Chief among government inducements are 
offers of favorable treatment regarding the witness’s own criminal matters.  
Commonly, the government must enter into plea deals, cooperation 
agreements, or immunity agreements with witnesses in order to secure their 
testimony against the defendant.  The government violates Brady if the 
government does not disclose the existence of these agreements.  This 
nondisclosure is exacerbated if the government allows these cooperating 
witnesses to falsely testify that no agreement with the government exists.47  
 
(suppressing crime victim’s pretrial statement that was diametrically opposed to her trial 
testimony as well as her failure to identify defendant at police line-up). 
45 E.g., Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82, 87 (4th Cir. 1991) (failing to disclose records of the 
victim’s hypnosis, which were used to enhance the victim’s testimony); United States v. 
Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-40 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (failing to disclose “severe 
credibility problems” of key government witness, including a history of mental health and 
substance abuse, as well the witness’ prior guilty plea to lying under oath in a case that led to 
the arrest of an innocent man); Munson, 886 P.2d at 1003 (failing to reveal the fact that 
testimony of one witness was hypnotically induced). 
46 E.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 700 (2004) (vacating death sentence and 
remanding case based in part on prosecution’s nondisclosure of financial payments, 
cooperation agreements, and other impeachment evidence involving the state’s two chief 
witnesses); Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075, 1078-80 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
prosecutor intimidated and threatened three juvenile witnesses to identify the defendant as 
the shooter); State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (ordering a new 
trial where prosecution failed to disclose that a key witness implicated the defendant on 
recorded interview only after being promised release from jail); Ex parte Brandley, 781 
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (finding that key government witnesses were 
threatened, choked, and manhandled by law enforcement officers prior to falsely implicating 
the defendant in the murder). 
47 See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); United States v. 
Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 932-37 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that prosecutor allowed key government 
witness to give unimpeached testimony that was either patently false or seriously misleading 
and which severely undercut the defense); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (failing to disclose government informant status and cooperation agreement with 
a key government witness); People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995) (finding error 
where government witness who had agreement with government for reduced charges 
committed perjury in denying the existence of any inducement to testify at trial and 
prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony); People v. Perkins, 686 N.E.2d 663, 669 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1997) (finding prosecution’s failure to correct government witness’ false testimony 
that he received no favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony was intentional where 
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In some cases, prosecutors have even affirmatively used the witness’s 
perjured testimony regarding the nonexistence of an agreement to bolster 
the credibility of the witness during closing arguments.48  In addition to 
agreements, the Brady doctrine also mandates disclosure of both pending 
criminal cases and prosecutable offenses committed by any witness and 
known by the government.49  The existence of these unresolved criminal 
cases could provide the witness with the expectation of favorable treatment 
even in the absence of a formal agreement with the government.50 
B.  “MATERIAL” EVIDENCE 
Non-disclosure of favorable evidence does not result in a Brady 
violation, however, unless the defense can establish that the withheld 
evidence was material or prejudicial to the defendant.51  In Kyles, the Court 
held that the Brady materiality requirement is satisfied by a showing that 
“the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”52  The 
defense must also show that, in light of the evidence of guilt adduced by the 
prosecution at trial, the withheld evidence was noncumulative, highly 
probative evidence that could have had an impact on the determination of 
guilt.53  The Court has stated that the defendant does not have to prove that 
he would have been acquitted had the Brady evidence been presented at 
trial but must show that, in the absence of the evidence, he did not receive a 
fair trial “resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”54 
 
“[o]ne of the prosecutors who tried this case participated in the earlier negotiations” with the 
witness to secure testimony). 
48 See, e.g., Banks, 540 U.S. at 700-02; Carriger, 132 F.3d at 470. 
49 E.g., Landano, 637 A.2d at 1271 (“[The] State suppressed evidence that its principal 
identification witness was under investigation for having ties with organized crime, and was 
suspected of having engaged in loan sharking and money laundering, and further, that on the 
very day his earlier tentative identification of defendant became positive, he was questioned 
about whether he paid illegal gratuities to [murdered police officer] where defendant was 
convicted of killing a police officer.”). 
50 See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). 
51 The Court has made clear that the materiality determination is synonymous with the 
prejudice analysis.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435-40 (1995); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985). 
52 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. 
53 E.g., United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no Brady 
violation where suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnished an additional basis on 
which to impeach a witness whose credibility had already been shown to be questionable); 
United State v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that materiality standard is less 
likely met where evidence of guilt is overwhelming). 
54 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  If the defendant does not make this showing, reviewing courts 
commonly rule that, although it was error for the prosecutor to suppress favorable evidence, 
in light of the evidence of guilt adduced at trial, the suppressed evidence was not material. 
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C.  Intentional Brady Violations 
From the inception of the Brady doctrine, the Court has consistently 
stated that the intent of the prosecutor is not determinative of whether a 
Brady violation has occurred.  In Agurs, the Court stated: 
[n]or do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, 
or the willfulness, of the prosecutor.  If evidence . . . of innocence is in his file, he 
should be presumed to recognize its significance. . . .  If the suppression of evidence 
results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the 
character of the prosecutor.55 
Though Brady violations can occur when a prosecutor accidentally or 
negligently withholds favorable information, intent is not completely 
irrelevant.  In determining whether to impose sanctions for Brady 
violations—particularly whether dismissal of the charges is warranted—
courts frequently rely on the presence or absence of evidence that the 
government acted with purpose or in bad faith. 
Intentional violations occur when the prosecutor fully understands the 
Brady disclosure duty, is aware of the existence of favorable evidence in the 
government’s possession, appreciates the exculpatory or impeachment 
value of the evidence, but intentionally withholds the evidence to gain a 
tactical advantage in the litigation.  Too frequently, the intentional 
withholding of Brady evidence has resulted in gross miscarriages of justice 
in state and federal courts across the country.  As in the case of Ted 
Stevens, courts have found intentional Brady violations based on the blatant 
and egregious conduct of prosecutors who knowingly used perjured 
testimony at trial,56 deliberately shielded exculpatory evidence from 
disclosure,57 purposely altered or falsified evidence,58 and knowingly 
exploited the absence of the very evidence the state withheld.59 
 
55 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). 
56 E.g., Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The prosecutor’s actions 
in this case are intolerable.  Possessed of knowledge that destroyed her theory of the case . . . 
she kept the facts secret . . . and then presented testimony in such a way as to suggest the 
opposite of what she alone knew to be true.”); People v. Perkins, 686 N.E.2d 663, 669 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1997); State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (“[T]he 
prosecution made every effort to suppress the recordings.  The prosecution knew if the 
material contained on these tapes was conveyed to defense counsel . . . the credibility of [the 
prosecution’s chief witness] would have been completely destroyed [and the defendant 
would have been acquitted].”). 
57 E.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the 
prosecutor “did everything he could to keep the defense from learning” of the existence and 
nature of the government’s cooperation agreement with witness); State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 
1270, 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that “it is apparent that the State 
deliberately concealed evidence” implicating the government’s two witnesses in the crime 
the defendant was charged with committing). 
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The impact of intentional Brady violations on the determination of 
guilt or innocence in criminal cases is significant.  One early study found 
that Brady violations played a major role in the wrongful conviction of 
more than one-third of the prisoners later exonerated by DNA evidence.60  
Even in the absence of DNA evidence, postconviction reinvestigations of 
old cases have also resulted in the exoneration of many prisoners wrongly 
convicted in trials tainted by intentional Brady violations.61  Most 
disturbing, however, is the undisputed fact that intentional Brady violations 
 
58 E.g., United States v. Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-40 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding 
that where the government “knowingly disguise[ed] the identity of a government witness and 
deceptively” allowed the witness to testify under oath and give a false name “[t]he 
conception and implementation of this plan was intentional and calculated to deprive the 
defense of its right of confrontation.  It almost succeeded.”); Price v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 
537 (Cal. 1982) (convicting defendant after prosecutor altered date and time of taxi cab 
receipt to place defendant at the scene of the crime, destroyed original evidence supporting 
the defendant’s alibi, and introduced the false evidence at trial).  
59 E.g., Arline v. State, 294 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that despite 
pretrial receipt of knife used by decedent to cut defendant during fatal encounter in self-
defense case, prosecutor “exaggerated [the knife’s] absence in evidence,” strongly 
suggesting to the jury that the knife did not exist); Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that prosecutors “engaged in a deliberate course of conduct” 
to keep exculpatory evidence away from defense counsel). 
60 In a study of the first seventy-four DNA-based exonerations, the Innocence Project 
found that the initial wrongful conviction was caused, in part, by Brady violations.  
Specifically, the study found that 37% of the cases involved the suppression of exculpatory 
evidence, 25% involved the knowing use of false testimony, and 11% involved the 
undisclosed use of coerced witness testimony.  BARRY SCHECK, JIM DWYER & PETER 
NEUFELD, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (1st ed. 2001); Innocence Project, Understand the Causes, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (follow the Forensic Science Misconduct and 
Government Misconduct hyperlinks) (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); see also CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS 91-100 
(2003) [hereinafter HARMFUL ERROR] (citing twenty-eight cases where prosecutorial 
misconduct, most commonly Brady violations, significantly contributed to the wrongful 
conviction of people who were later exonerated). 
61 E.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 548 (D.N.J. 1985) (granting habeas relief in 
the case of famed boxer Rubin “Hurricane” Carter where the prosecution purposely 
misrepresented the results of a polygraph test given to its key witness in order to manipulate 
the witness into abandoning his recantation and giving the inculpatory testimony at the re-
trial that placed defendants at the scene of the crime); People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977, 
982-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding that defense was denied powerful impeachment 
evidence in child sexual assault trial where the government argued that the child’s extensive 
knowledge of sexual activity stemmed from sexual abuse by defendant but suppressed 
documents showing that child had an unusually advanced knowledge and sophistication 
regarding sexual matters well before the alleged sexual assault); Ex parte Adams, 768 
S.W.2d 281, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (finding in murder case that “the State was guilty 
of suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, deceiving the trial court during [the] trial, 
and knowingly using perjured testimony”). 
430 Cynthia E. Jones [Vol. 100 
have resulted in near executions in numerous death penalty cases.62  In one 
case, after twelve years on death row, a man came within fifteen hours of 
execution before being granted habeas relief.63  More recently, Delma 
Banks was strapped to a gurney in the Texas death chamber and was within 
ten minutes of execution when the Supreme Court granted a stay of 
execution and ruled that he was entitled to habeas relief based on Brady 
violations that infected his trial.64  There have been numerous other 
reversals of capital convictions based on intentional Brady violations.65  In 
the overwhelming majority of capital murder cases, once Brady violations 
are exposed, the government opts not to retry the case,66 or the formerly 
 
62 E.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR 
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 5 (2000), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/ 
instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_final.pdf (documenting Brady violations in 16% to 
19% of capital cases); DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. 
Cassell eds., 2004) (finding that 35 out of 350 wrongful convictions based on wrongful 
suppression of evidence); Ames Alexander & Liz Chandler, Errors, Inequities Often Cloud 
Capital Cases in the Carolinas, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 2000, at 1A (stating that in 
“North Carolina since 1977[,] . . . [c]ourts have overturned more than 25 death sentences, 
many based on findings that prosecutors hid evidence, made improper arguments, or broke 
other rules”). 
63 Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1986) (vacating 1974 capital 
murder convictions upon finding that the prosecutor failed to step forward when the only 
witness at trial to place the defendant at the scene of the crime and the only witness to testify 
to incriminating admissions by the defendant falsely testified that he had not received 
immunity from the government in exchange for his testimony). 
64 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 133 (2007); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
65 E.g., State v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (vacating death sentence 
and ordering a new trial due to nondisclosure of exculpatory information in FBI reports); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322-25 (Pa. 1992) (reversing death sentence upon 
finding that the government’s “intentional suppression” of extremely “exculpatory physical 
evidence” while arguing in favor of the death sentence on direct appeal “constitute[s] 
prosecutorial misconduct such as violat[ing] all principles of justice and fairness”). 
66 See Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075, 1078-80 (5th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Wainwright, 
785 F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1986); Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1995); Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252-53 (Ga. 1991); Taylor Bright, Guilty Until 
Proven Innocent?, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, Dec. 14, 2001, available at 
http://www.patrickcrusade.org/execution_2_5.htm (reporting that after court ordered a new 
trial, District Attorney decided not to prosecute former condemned prisoner); Jingle Davis & 
Mark Curriden, Condemned Man Is Freed After Repeal, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 7, 1991, 
at E2 (reporting that prosecutors decided they could not re-prosecute Gary Zant following 
the reversal of his capital murder conviction for the rape and murder of a six-year-old girl); 
Sydney P. Freedberg, Freed from Death Row, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 1999, at 8A, 
available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/70499/State/yesangry.shtml (stating that after 
twelve years in prison, on remand, the prosecutor’s office opted not to retry the case against 
Joseph Greene Brown and the former death row inmate was released after over five years on 
death row); Mexican Long Held in Texas Murder Wins His Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
1997, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/17/us/mexican-long-held-in-
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condemned prisoners are acquitted at a retrial.67  In other cases, death row 
inmates are given parole,68 allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge and 
released based on time served,69 or sentenced to life without parole.70  
Rarely are formerly condemned prisoners resentenced to death after the 
conviction is reversed based on Brady misconduct.71  Thus Brady 
violations, if undetected and undeterred, could result in the death of people 
who, under the law, deserve either life or liberty. 
D.  LITIGATING BRADY VIOLATIONS 
Under the current state of the law, several factors make pretrial 
litigation and adjudication of Brady violations extremely difficult.  First, 
pretrial disclosure of Brady evidence is governed by an unrealistic “honor 
 
texas-murder-wins-his-freedom.html (reporting that Ricardo Aldape Guerra had spent over 
fifteen years in prison and, at one point, came within three days of execution); see also 
Chevel Johnson, No Retrial in New Orleans Killing, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 9, 
1999 (stating that the youngest person ever sentenced to death row at age seventeen, Shareef 
Cousins, was given a new trial in a case involving Brady violations, but the sentence was 
ultimately reversed on other grounds because prosecutors did not have enough evidence to 
pursue the case a second time). 
67 See, e.g., Moore, 969 So. 2d at 185; State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1994); Richard L. Fricker, State Falters in Retrial of Escaped Con, A.B.A. J., June 
1995, at 38 (describing the acquittal of Adolph Munson at re-trial after ten years on death 
row); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Exonerations: Jury Acquits Former Death Row Inmate of All 
Charges, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/exonerations-jury-acquits-former-death-row-
inmate-all-charges (last visited Jan. 19, 2010) (describing the acquittal of a man on all counts 
in third trial after nearly ten years on death row). 
68 Ryan Issues Blanket Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 14, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205191.pdf.  Madison Hobley, who 
spent eighteen years in prison, most of it on death row, was pardoned by Governor Ryan in 
Illinois during his mass purge of prisoners on death row.  Id. 
69 Dave Von Drehle, Murder Suspects Will Plead Guilty, Leave Court Free, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1988, at 2G, available at 1988 WLNR 468637 (“U.S. District 
Judge George Carr found that detectives deliberately suppressed evidence that might have 
pointed to the innocence of Jent and Miller . . . [and that] [t]he State of Florida demonstrated 
‘a callous and deliberate disregard for the fundamental principles of truth and fairness that 
underlie our criminal system.’”). 
70 Smith, 615 A.2d 321; Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence Cases: 1984-1993, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-cases-1984-1993 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) 
(describing the ultimate disposition in the Smith case where defendant’s original death 
sentence was reduced to life in prison). 
71 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 
1999, at 1, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-dptrialerror-
special,0,632955.special.  Of the sixty-seven death row inmates granted new trials due to 
Brady violations, twenty-four were freed because charges were dropped, they were acquitted 
at re-trial, or they were given full pardons.  Three plead guilty in return for their immediate 
release from prison, twenty-five others were convicted again (but did not receive the death 
penalty), and only four returned to death row.  Id.  
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code” system.  Prosecutors are in exclusive possession of the evidence 
collected during the criminal investigation.  They alone are entrusted to 
exercise their discretion and make a subjective evaluation of the case to 
determine whether there is favorable evidence subject to disclosure.72  Even 
if the prosecutor determines that favorable evidence exists, it is the 
prosecutor who is entrusted with determining when, if at all, that evidence 
will be disclosed to the defense.  Lower courts charged with enforcing the 
Brady mandate have repeatedly ruled that Brady does not require pretrial 
disclosure even when the government is aware of the favorable evidence 
prior to trial.73  Prosecutors need only disclose favorable evidence to the 
defense “in time for its effective use at trial.”74  Thus, prosecutors can (and 
do) purposely withhold Brady evidence until the last possible minute (and 
beyond) with full knowledge that the vital information in their exclusive 
possession could significantly bolster the defense case or seriously 
undermine the government’s case.75 
Moreover, prosecutors are also empowered to make the pretrial 
determination of whether a particular piece of favorable evidence meets the 
materiality standard.  Many courts have observed that the impact-based 
analysis used to determine materiality is unworkable as a pretrial standard 
for prosecutors attempting in good faith to comply with Brady.76  The 
Supreme Court also acknowledged as much in Agurs, when it stated that the 
pretrial materiality determination is “inevitably imprecise” and recognized 
that “the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted 
accurately until the entire record is complete.”77  As Justice Marshall stated 
in his opinion in Bagley, rather than promoting full and complete 
 
72 See, e.g., Moore, 969 So. 2d at 175 (noting that the prosecutor testified that “he never 
intended to withhold exculpatory information and that he did not consider some of the 
materials to be exculpatory”). 
73 See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 n.9 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[D]isclosure in time for effective use at 
trial is all that the Brady doctrine requires.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 1143 (5th ed. 2009). 
74 Coppa, 267 F.3d at 142. 
75 E.g., Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (finding that a mid-trial 
four-day delay prior to disclosure of exculpatory information constitutes a Brady violation); 
People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (discussed supra notes 134-137 
and accompanying text); Page v. Roberts, 611 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) 
(granting new trial when district attorney kept exculpatory statement for over a year until the 
day prior to the start of trial when witness could no longer be found). 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Most 
prosecutors are neither neutral (nor should they be) nor prescient, and any such judgment [on 
materiality] necessarily is speculative on so many matters that simply are unknown and 
unknowable before trial begins . . . .”). 
77 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). 
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disclosure, the materiality standard legitimizes nondisclosure by allowing 
prosecutors to determine which favorable evidence is material and will be 
disclosed and which favorable evidence is not material and can be 
constitutionally withheld. 78 
While the Court has expressed its hope that “the prudent prosecutor 
will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” there is no assurance 
that all prosecutors will heed the Court’s caution and err on the side of 
disclosure.79  Other than the unenforceable “honor code,” there are few 
incentives for prosecutors to comply with Brady because there is no 
meaningful judicial oversight of the process.80  The trial judge does not 
know what evidence exists in the government’s files, what evidence the 
prosecutor has withheld, or why the prosecutor has unilaterally decided not 
to disclose certain evidence to the defense.  Prosecutors do not have to keep 
a log of the evidence in the case.  Nor are prosecutors required to seek an in 
camera review of potential Brady evidence prior to making the decision 
that evidence will not be disclosed.  As a result, the trial court has only a 
limited ability to make a pretrial determinations of whether the prosecutor 
has fully complied with Brady. 
The lack of judicial oversight of Brady disclosure decisions is 
compounded by the fact that, absent extraordinary circumstances, it is very 
likely that the defense will never learn of the existence of favorable 
evidence and cannot, therefore, seek leave of the court to compel disclosure.  
The very nature of the act of withholding evidence ensures that the defense 
does not know that such evidence is contained in the prosecutor’s nonpublic 
case file.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, the defense learns of 
Brady evidence by pure accident.81  Sometimes the defense stumbles upon a 
 
78 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (1985) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., 
dissenting). 
79 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1994). 
80 LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 24.3(b) at 1147-48 (noting that trial courts are reluctant to 
review prosecutor’s files to determine whether they have undisclosed Brady material); cf. 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (limiting authority of the court to impose in 
camera review for disputed Brady material). 
81 United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that exculpatory 
contents of a tape recording were obtained by defense post-trial when prosecutor 
inadvertently sent transcripts of the tapes to the defense attorney); see McMillian v. State, 
616 So. 2d 933, 945 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (involving a tape recording inadvertently given 
to defense counsel wherein the sheriff and other law enforcement officers were threatening 
the government’s star witness to force him to falsely implicate McMillan); Armstrong & 
Possley, supra note 71 (discussing the case of James Richardson who was wrongly convicted 
in Florida and served twenty-one years in prison before exculpatory evidence was “stolen 
from a prosecutor’s office by a man dating the prosecutor’s secretary”; also reporting on 
other cases wherein exculpatory evidence was discovered after “a judge directed the U.S. 
marshal to seize the prosecutors’ documents, or because newspapers sued under the Freedom 
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lay witness who possesses the information.82  Alternatively, as in the 
Stevens case, members of the prosecution team belatedly come forward and 
disclose the existence of favorable evidence.  The constitutional right of 
criminal defendants to acquire exculpatory evidence for use at trial should 
not depend on sheer luck or the industriousness of the defense investigative 
team.  As the Court recognized in Banks: “[a] rule thus declaring 
‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.”83 
E.  BRADY REFORM PROPOSALS 
Numerous Brady reforms have been proposed by jurists and legal 
scholars over the past two decades to address the myriad of problems 
associated with the enforcement of the Brady mandate.  Notwithstanding 
these reform efforts, the Brady disclosure duty has become one of the most 
unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal justice system.84  
According to several major national studies, Brady violations in state and 
federal courts have been continuous and persistent over the forty-five years 
since the Brady decision.85  One landmark study found that during the first 
 
of Information Act, or because of anonymous tips, conversations accidentally overheard or 
papers spied in a prosecutor’s hand”); see also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a 
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 869 (1997) (stating that judicial opinions involving 
Brady violations “appear in the reporters only because the criminal defendant, deprived of 
any knowledge of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor’s refusal to disclose it, was 
nevertheless able my some other means (often highly fortuitous) to discover its existence”). 
82 E.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004) (noting that “long suppressed 
evidence came to light” after attorneys for death row defendant received affidavits from 
government witnesses detailing that, contrary to trial testimony, and the representations of 
prosecutors, witnesses were coached, paid for their testimony and threatened with 
incarceration if they did not provide false inculpatory testimony against the defendant); State 
v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169, 173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (stating that defense was alerted to 
exculpatory information by witness who contacted defense counsel after trial); State v. 
Cousin, 710 So. 2d 1065, 1067 n.2 (La. 1998) (stating that the defense learned “through an 
anonymous communication” during the penalty phase of a capital case that eyewitness who 
identified defendant as murderer previously told police that she could not identify the 
gunman because she did not get a good look at him, was not wearing her glasses, and could 
only see shapes and patterns). 
83 Banks, 540 U.S. at 696. 
84 See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 5:1, 5:3 (2d ed. 2002) 
(“Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors . . . account[s] for more 
miscarriages of justice than any other type of prosecutorial infraction.”). 
85 See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 71; see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60, 
at i (reporting that a three-year study of over eleven thousand reported opinions involving 
prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) found that over two thousand cases 
led to reversal of conviction and twenty-eight defendants were later exonerated); see also 
Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at A1, available 
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thirty-six years after Brady, 381 homicide cases across the country were 
reversed due to Brady violations.86  A 2009 study further confirmed that 
Brady violations continue to be an on-going problem.87 
Reform efforts to combat Brady violations are frequently stalled by 
non-reformers (usually prosecutors and former prosecutors) who persist in 
the assertion that Brady violations are an extremely rare occurrence.88  
Given the hundreds of thousands of cases prosecuted annually across the 
country, they argue that the number of reported Brady violations is de 
minimis.89  Moreover, the small minority of prosecutors committing Brady 
violations are far outnumbered by the overwhelming number of ethical 
prosecutors committed to ensuring that justice is done and that all Brady 
evidence is properly disclosed to the defense.90  Thus, non-reformers 
maintain that Brady violations are more “episodic” than “epidemic”91 and 
that many of the proposed reforms unnecessarily interfere with the 
independence of the prosecution function.  These proposed reforms, they 
contend, would curtail the broad discretion that prosecutors must have to 
perform their jobs effectively and free from undue judicial interference.92  
 
at http://www.post-gazette.com/win/ (documenting, in a ten-part series, a two-year 
investigation into prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) across the country). 
86 Armstrong & Possley, supra note 71. 
87 TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 26 (citing numerous New 
York cases involving Brady violations and stating that “despite the clarity and longevity of 
the Brady rule, a sampling of recent published or otherwise available decisions show such 
conduct still occurs”). 
88 Randall D. Eliason, The Prosecutor’s Role: A Response to Professor Davis, AM. U. 
CRIM. L. BRIEF, Fall 2006, at 15, 17-18, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/ 
clb/documents/CriminalLawBrief-VolIIIssueI-Fall2006.pdf?rd=1 (commenting that given 
the number of prosecutors in the country (over 35,000) and the number of criminal cases 
prosecuted each year (twenty million in state courts and 70,000 in federal courts), the 
incidences of prosecutorial misconduct are extremely small). 
89 Id. at 20 (dismissing statistics from Harmful Error study which found serious 
prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) in a total of two thousand cases 
(average of sixty-six cases per year) as statistically insignificant because “sixty-six cases per 
year out of several million is a vanishingly small number.  Even if the true incidence of 
prosecutorial misconduct, reported and unreported, were 500 times greater than what was 
found[,] . . . it would still involve only about one percent of all serious criminal cases filed in 
a year.” (emphasis omitted)). 
90 Id. at 17 (“[T]he vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated public servants striving to 
do a difficult job in an ethical and honorable way.”). 
91 HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60, at 110 (providing a copy of a letter from an Oregon 
prosecutor stating that prosecutorial misconduct is “episodic” and not “epidemic,” and 
stating that “prosecutors continue to be subject to the harshest sanctions on those truly rare 
occasions when they violate their oaths”). 
92 TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 36 n.11.  In response to a 
proposal to have a mandatory Brady conference with the trial judge in criminal cases, 
dissenting Task Force members argued that “mandating a pretrial conference in every case 
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Non-reformers also steadfastly contend that when Brady violations do 
infrequently occur, the wrongful actions of these few errant prosecutors are 
adequately addressed by the current mechanisms in place within 
prosecution offices and the external sanctioning power of the state bar.93 
The “epidemic” versus “episodic” debate, of course, misses the point.  
The problem with Brady violations is not the frequency with which they 
occur, it is the fact that they occur at all.  By definition, Brady violations 
involve the withholding of material evidence that has a significant adverse 
impact on the accuracy of the guilt/innocence determination.  Thus, even 
one Brady violation is too many when such misconduct can and does result 
in a wrongful conviction or a sentence of death.  Just as it would be 
unacceptable to allow a preventable or curable disease to go untreated 
simply because it affects only a small number of people each year, we 
cannot allow Brady violations—even if infrequent and isolated—to remain 
“untreated.”  In the fair and just criminal justice system we strive to create, 
we should have zero tolerance for these preventable errors.   
Against the backdrop of this ongoing reform debate, legal scholars and 
jurists have proposed a wide array of reforms.  Some of the proposed 
reforms would simply mandate better enforcement and utilization of 
existing laws and standards.  For example, many have proposed more 
aggressive use of the state bar disciplinary process to punish prosecutors for 
violating the professional standards that make it unethical for them to 
withhold favorable evidence.94  While the use of the state bar disciplinary 
process is a viable option, numerous studies and reports have shown that 
 
for judicial review of the prosecutor’s file impermissibly allows the judicial branch to 
intrude into the exclusive domain of a member of the executive branch, the prosecutor, in the 
advocacy determination of what to disclose and when; weakens the adversary system and the 
vigorous performance of the prosecutor’s function.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
93 Eliason, supra note 88, at 21 (citing the state bar disciplinary process and the 
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility as powerful sources of 
“professional repercussions” for errant prosecutors who engage in misconduct). 
94 E.g., CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 77 (Gerald Uelmen 
ed., 2008) (discussing judicial reluctance to refer lawyers for professional discipline for 
Brady misconduct), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf; 
see also TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 28-29; Robert P. 
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental 
Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007); Paul J. Speigelman, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 170 (1999) (noting that of forty-five recent federal cases where 
convictions were reversed due to “intentional misconduct and extensive criticism of 
prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prosecutor disciplined or referred a prosecutor 
for discipline”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275 (2004) (advocating the creation of an 
independent commission to examine wrongful convictions cases and enforce disciplinary 
rules for prosecutors).  
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prosecutors are generally not referred for disciplinary action for Brady 
misconduct, and it is extremely rare that such a referral results in 
professional discipline.95  Thus, without greater enforcement of ethical 
rules, reliance on the state bar disciplinary process to deter and punish 
Brady misconduct is misplaced.   
A second category of proposed Brady reforms would require major 
changes in existing law to implement.  Legal scholars have proposed 
subjecting prosecutors to civil liability for their actions by eliminating or 
reducing the broad immunity prosecutors currently enjoy.96  In light of 
recent Supreme Court precedent upholding prosecutorial immunity, this 
proposal is not likely to succeed.97  Other reform proposals, including the 
use of criminal sanctions and contempt citations against prosecutors, are 
also very rarely used.98  Moreover, the effectiveness of these measures 
 
95 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987) (discussing the results of a nation-wide empirical 
study of state bar disciplinary actions for Brady violations and finding few prosecutors are 
referred and even fewer are actually disciplined); see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) (discussing Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which defines the scope of the prosecutor’s duty to make timely 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence under ethics rules independent of the constitutional 
disclosure duty); see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60, at 81-90.  But see Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 
06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n July 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf.  In the high profile investigation of 
allegations that an African-American woman was gang-raped at an off-campus party hosted 
by college students who were members of the Duke University lacrosse team, the prosecutor 
violated Brady by suppressing exculpatory DNA results that excluded the defendants and by 
instructing a doctor to withhold such evidence from his medical report.  The prosecutor was 
held in contempt following an independent investigation.  Id.  See generally Angela J. Davis, 
The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
275 (2007).  
96 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
district attorney’s failure to train employees on their Brady obligations and “the duty not to 
lie or persecute the innocent” subjected her to liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983); see also 
Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (following re-
prosecution of defendant by the same prosecutor who “allegedly slammed his case file 
against the courtroom wall, screamed at [the defendant Yarris], ‘Motherfucker, you’ll never 
leave the county alive!’ and spat in Yarris’s face,” and finding that prosecutor’s conduct in 
destroying exculpatory evidence was not covered by absolute immunity). 
97 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (holding that the chief deputy 
district attorney and district attorney were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity). 
98 Weeks, supra note 81, at 879 (dismissing as improbable “the alternative of criminal 
sanctions for civil rights violations” due to Brady violations).  But see United States v. Jones, 
609 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009) (requiring the government to show cause why the court 
should not impose sanctions for Brady violation after the prosecutor failed to turn over the 
inconsistent statements of a police officer).  Also, some state court rules and statutes 
expressly recognize contempt as a discovery sanction.  E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
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depends on the willingness of individual judges and prosecution offices to 
take punitive measures against errant prosecutors.  Judges have been 
reluctant to take action, and as one scholar noted, “[p]rosecutors simply will 
not prosecute other prosecutors.”99   
Similarly, some scholars and jurists have proposed amending Rule 16, 
the criminal discovery provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to include mandatory disclosure of Brady evidence.100  Included 
among the provisions of the potential Rule 16 amendment is a requirement 
that prosecutors make timely disclosure of all favorable evidence, 
irrespective of any pretrial materiality determination they have made.101  
This Brady amendment to Rule 16 was vigorously opposed by the 
Department of Justice and ultimately defeated.102 
The final category of Brady reforms involves administrative changes 
within prosecution offices to enhance compliance with the Brady disclosure 
 
Art. 729.5(B) (2003) (stating that willful violation of discovery rule “shall be deemed to be a 
constructive contempt of court”); see also ARK R. CRIM. P. 19.7(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.220(n)(2); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(ii); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(ii); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
9.03(8); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(2); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(ii). 
99 Weeks, supra note 81, at 879. 
100 Brady Report, supra note 35, at 6.  The proposed “Brady Amendment” to Rule 16 
provided: 
Exculpatory or Impeaching Information.  Upon a defendant’s request, the government must 
make available all information that is known to the attorney for the government or agents of law 
enforcement involved in the investigation of the case that is either exculpatory or impeaching.  
The court may not order disclosure of impeachment information earlier than 14 days before trial. 
Id. at 23 app. A (emphasis omitted) (providing the text of the Brady Amendment); see also 
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information 
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93 (2004). 
101 Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 100, at 113. 
102 See Brady Report, supra note 35, at 4.  In opposition to the Rule 16 amendment, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued before the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Advisory Committee”) that no codification of the Brady 
rule was warranted because the Brady disclosure obligation was already “clearly defined” 
under existing law.  Id. at 6-7.  Although DOJ opposed the amendment, DOJ representatives 
revised the Department of Justice Manual for United States Attorneys in an effort to more 
clearly define the scope of the Brady disclosure duty under existing law.  See also id. at 6-7, 
43 app. D (providing the text of United States Attorney’s Policy Regarding Disclosure of 
Exculpatory and Impeachment Information, § 9-5.001).  Following the Ted Stevens 
litigation, the federal judge who presided over the case, Judge Emmet Sullivan, wrote a letter 
to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee urging reconsideration of the Brady 
Amendment to Rule 16.  Letter from Judge Emmett G. Sullivan to Judge Richard C. 
Tallman, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009) (on file with author).  Judge Sullivan wrote: “An amendment to 
Rule 16 that requires the government to produce all exculpatory information to the defense 
serves the best interests of the court, the prosecution, the defense, and ultimately the public.”  
Id. 
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duty.  These reforms include improved training, the creation of detailed 
guidelines on Brady disclosure,103 and administrative procedures to track 
and catalog Brady evidence to make disclosure more efficient.104  Advocates 
of these internal reforms suggest that such measures would combat 
confusion over the scope of the disclosure duty and avoid carelessness or 
negligent nondisclosures. 
While some of these proposals could potentially curb Brady violations 
when nondisclosure is the result of carelessness or negligence, it is unlikely 
that many of these measures would be sufficient to curb the more egregious, 
intentional Brady violations committed by prosecutors determined to “win 
at all costs.”  In numerous cases, nondisclosure is the result of a deliberate 
choice to withhold evidence that the prosecutor knows is subject to 
disclosure under Brady.  The intentional, purposeful nature of the Brady 
violation in those cases is illustrated by the varied excuses articulated by 
prosecutors in defense of their decisions to conceal Brady evidence.  For 
example, prosecutors have defended their intentional suppression of Brady 
evidence on the grounds that (1) the witness that provided an exculpatory 
pretrial statement was not, in the prosecutor’s mind, a credible witness;105 
 
103 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 87-91 
(recommending that State Attorney General formulate and disseminate a written office 
policy to govern Brady compliance, create a “Brady list” of impeachment evidence against 
law enforcement officers/witnesses, and hold training programs on Brady disclosure 
compliance); see also JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY REVIEW 3-6 (2009), available at 
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/pr-improving-prosecutorial-
accountability1.pdf (recommending increased training for line prosecutors on Brady 
disclosure duties); TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 37-38 
(recommending same). 
104 ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM. TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY 
OF THE CRIM. PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE 
GUILTY 1, 103 (2006) (“In light of the prosecutor’s on-going obligation to disclose Brady 
material and the desire to provide all defendants with fair trial, prosecutors should establish 
guidelines and procedures for turning Brady evidence over to the defense and for receiving 
that information from its partners and agents, including police departments and 
laboratories.”); CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 12-16; 
TERZANO ET AL., supra note 103, at 7-8; Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: 
Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619, 641 (2007) (advocating for the head 
prosecutor to provide “clearer guidance that ensures complete compliance with Brady,” and 
proposing “open file” discovery to give defense attorneys greater access to discoverable 
materials); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the 
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 257 (2008).  
105 In United States v. Harrington, the government failed to disclose the existence of a 
witness who contradicted the trial testimony of the government’s star witness and implicated 
that witness as the true perpetrator of the crime.  The government claimed that it did not 
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(2) the exculpatory evidence was not subject to disclosure because it would 
have been inadmissible at trial;106 (3) the exculpatory statement was not 
Brady evidence because the same statement also contained other 
inculpatory information;107 or (4) the prosecutor did not personally believe 
the witness’s pretrial inconsistent statement was credible.108  It is difficult to 
accept that prosecutors in possession of evidence that falls squarely within 
the scope of the Brady doctrine could honestly form the professional 
opinion that disclosure was not mandated for any of these reasons.  As one 
court stated in rejecting a prosecutor’s incredulous excuse for suppressing 
blatantly exculpatory evidence, “Such an explanation is laughable, offering 
it an effrontery.  It does not wash, nor do we believe for a moment that the 
prosecutor could have been so simple-minded as to have believed it 
would.”109   
Thus, although the wide array of reform proposals that have been 
advanced by jurists and legal scholars have the potential to greatly improve 
 
disclose the witness’s pretrial statements to the defense because the government did not find 
the witness to be credible.  In reversing the murder conviction, the trial judge stated: 
[B]oth the identity and the testimony of Ms. Gibson, unquestionably, without any doubt, should 
have been turned over to the defense well in advance of trial. . . .  [T]he information about Ms. 
Gibson’s identity and her information and her grand jury testimony and her police statement was 
withheld from the defense consciously, deliberately, and as a tactic, because I think the 
Government probably recognized it as not particularly favorable to their case, at a minimum, 
and may have recognized it as something that could be mischievous in the hands of a good 
defense lawyer. . . .  In my opinion, it was patently disclosable, not a debatable point. . . .   [T]he 
government’s attempt to explain away the evidence that is, in my view obviously favorable to the 
accused, is unavailing largely for the reason pointed out by [defense counsel]: It’s not for [the 
prosecutor] to decide whether Ms. Gibson would be believable . . . it’s for the jury to decide . . . . 
Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motion to Dismiss at 9-10, 13, United States v. 
Harrington, No. 2007-CF1-22855 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with author) 
(emphasis added). 
106 Branch v. State, 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (arguing that a lack of 
proper chain-of-custody excused the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the knife purportedly 
belonging to decedent that was given to the police shortly after a fatal brawl). 
107 Gwen Filosa, Review Board Clears Prosecutor, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 25, 2004, at 
B1 (discussing statements made by Roger Jordan, a seasoned prosecutor in New Orleans, 
during a state bar disciplinary proceeding related to his prosecution of Shareef Cousins for 
capital murder); see also State v. Cousins, 710 So. 2d 1065, 1066-67 (La. 1998) (discussed 
supra note 66). 
108 Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1985) (“As for the prosecutor’s 
attempted explanation of his refusal to produce the police report[,] . . . [i]t was for the jury, 
not the prosecutor, to decide whether the contents of an official police record were credible, 
especially where—as here—they were in the nature of an admission against the state’s 
interest in prosecuting Lindsey.  On such grounds as these, prosecutors might, on a claim 
that they thought it unreliable, refuse to produce any matter whatever helpful to the 
defense.”); see, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009) (discussed infra 
Part IV).  
109 King, 769 F.2d at 1040. 
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the disclosure of Brady evidence, comprehensive Brady reform must also 
include measures specifically designed to address intentional, purposeful 
violations.  The two proposals discussed in Parts III and IV below 
recommend the presentation of evidence of the Brady misconduct at trial 
either as a punitive sanction or as relevant circumstantial evidence of the 
government’s consciousness of a weak case. 
III: THE “BRADY INSTRUCTION” SANCTION 
If a young boy takes his sister’s rag doll and purposely hides it from 
her to prevent his little sister from playing with the doll, upon learning of 
her son’s behavior, the mother will likely order her son to return the doll 
and instruct the little boy not to take his sister’s toy again.  Is more 
punishment of the little boy mandated?  Probably not.  While the mother 
clearly has the authority and the discretion to impose more severe sanctions, 
like ordering the little boy to forego playing with his own toys for a while, 
the little boy’s transgression probably is not serious enough to warrant more 
than a mild rebuke from his mother.  If instead of a rag doll, the little boy 
intentionally withheld his sister’s asthma inhaler while she was gasping for 
air during an asthma attack, the mother would undoubtedly view her son’s 
conduct with greater disdain and feel it necessary and appropriate to impose 
a sanction beyond simply ordering him to give his sister the medication.  In 
the criminal justice system, the suppression of Brady evidence is treated 
with the triviality of a lost rag doll, when it should be treated with the 
exigency of an asthma attack.  Instead of exercising its broad authority to 
impose appropriate, meaningful sanctions, courts simply order the 
government to disclose the Brady evidence and offer the defense a 
continuance to “catch its breath” before the next trial date.  As discussed 
more fully below, compelled disclosure, without more, is an inadequate 
sanction for the intentional destruction or withholding of Brady material, 
because it does little to enforce the constitutionally mandated disclosure 
duty and does even less to deter future violations. 
Given the fact that the existing extrajudicial entities with the power to 
regulate prosecutors and punish Brady misconduct have been ineffective or 
underutilized, the burden falls on judges to redress Brady misconduct.110  In 
addition to the direct assault on the defendant’s right to a fair trial, Brady 
violations corrupt the fact-finding process of the trial.111  As Justice 
 
110 Joy, supra note 104, at 631 (stating that until systemic reforms are implemented 
judges have the responsibility to take measures to curtail Brady violations). 
111 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (“The very integrity of the judicial 
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within 
the framework of the rules of evidence.”); see also Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 
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Brennan stated, “Criminal discovery is not a game.  It is integral to the 
quest for truth and the fair adjudication of guilt or innocence.  Violations of 
discovery rules thus cannot go uncorrected or undeterred without 
undermining the truthseeking process.”112  Moreover, nondisclosure of 
Brady evidence gives prosecutors the authority to usurp the power of the 
trial judge and unilaterally decide what evidence will be presented at trial 
and what evidence will be excluded.113  In so doing, the jury is forced to 
reach a verdict based on a distorted, “prosecution-friendly” version of the 
facts.  Predictably, this leads to unreliable verdicts, wrongful convictions, 
and the erosion of public confidence in the ability of the judicial system to 
convict only the guilty and free the innocent.  Courts, therefore, have a 
vested interest in imposing meaningful sanctions to thwart this invidious 
form of prosecutorial misconduct to vindicate the affront to judicial 
integrity.  The goal advanced by imposing meaningful sanctions for Brady 
violations is not merely to punish the individual prosecutor but to ensure 
that the government does not feel empowered to violate constitutional 
mandates with impunity.114  Jurists and legal scholars are in accord that 
sanctions should be imposed not only to protect the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial but also to deter future Brady violations.115 
 
SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 344 (2007) (“[W]hen left unchecked [prosecutorial] misconduct 
undermines the integrity of the system itself, thereby threatening the equally important 
appearance of a fair trial. . . .  [T]here is an incalculable cost in damaged integrity [to the 
judicial system itself] that may be difficult to repair[.]”) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
omitted); Joy, supra note 104, at 628 (“When false testimony is introduced into evidence, or 
exculpatory evidence is withheld from the defendant for possible use at trial, the justice 
system is derailed.”); Paul J. Speigelman, supra note 94, at 131 (“Intentional wrongdoing in 
court by perhaps the most critical member of the government law enforcement team calls 
into question the fairness and integrity of the trial.”). 
112 Taylor, 484 U.S. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“When prosecutors betray their solemn obligations and abuse the immense 
power they hold, the fairness of our entire justice system is called into doubt and public 
confidence in it is undermined.”). 
113 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (stating that the disclosure duties 
imposed by the Brady doctrine “preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s 
private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal 
accusations”). 
114 Dale A. Nance, Evidentiary Foul Play: The Roles of Judge and Jury in Responding to 
Evidence Tampering, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 3 (2009) (stating that deterrence of 
discovery misconduct is a goal of imposing discovery sanctions, but noting that sanctions are 
not designed to punish the litigant but constitute an “effort to protect the integrity of the 
system of adjudication by refusing to submit cases to the jury when they have been 
inappropriately prepared”). 
115 United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Quite as important as 
assuring a fair trial to the defendants now before us is assuring that the circumstances that 
gave rise to the misconduct won’t be repeated in other cases.”); State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 
384 (Minn. 1982) (stating that reversal of conviction is sometimes warranted not simply to 
2010] A Reason to Doubt 443 
A.  THE CURRENT SANCTIONS SCHEME FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS 
The Supreme Court has never articulated the range of sanctions that 
should be imposed when the government fails to comply with the Brady 
disclosure duty.116  In practice, when Brady violations are discovered after 
trial, the usual remedy is a new trial in which the previously withheld 
evidence can be introduced by the defense.117  When Brady violations are 
discovered pretrial, the court usually orders the government to disclose the 
suppressed evidence and, if necessary, grants a continuance in order to give 
the defense the opportunity to make effective use of the exculpatory 
information.118  Simply ordering the prosecutor to disclose the Brady 
evidence is, of course, more of a directive than a sanction, because the 
prosecutor is not required to do anything above and beyond that which was 
already constitutionally mandated.119  Under this scheme, the consequences 
of noncompliance with Brady are identical to the consequences of 
compliance—disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense.  Therefore, 
simply mandating compelled disclosure as a Brady sanction is not a potent 
deterrent to prosecutors who would purposely withhold favorable evidence. 
Likewise, granting a continuance of the trial date in response to a 
Brady violation is not an effective sanction alternative because of the wide 
range of collateral consequences.  First, defendants that have been detained 
pretrial are forced to endure a more prolonged loss of liberty if a 
continuance of the trial date is necessitated by the government’s failure to 
comply with its Brady disclosure duty.  In jurisdictions with crowded court 
dockets, the length of the delay could extend for several months.  Moreover, 
following the disclosure of the previously suppressed Brady evidence, the 
 
remedy a potentially unjust trial result, but as a means to provide the incentive to prosecutors 
to obey disclosure obligations); see also Weeks, supra note 81, at 913 (“By increasing 
substantially the risk of reversal as a sanction for suppression of exculpatory evidence, 
the . . . standards might reasonably be expected to increase the degree of disclosure by 
prosecutors anxious to avoid this result.”).  See generally Cynthia E. Jones, The Right 
Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for the Destruction of DNA Evidence, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2945 nn.288-89 (discussing the goals advanced by discovery 
sanctions). 
116 See Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field, Part III or What’s on the Discovery 
Channel, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 67, 74 (2003) (concluding that Brady violations must be met 
with “real remedies with serious consequences for prosecutors who fail to comply”). 
117 See LAFAVE, supra note 73, at 1143. 
118 Id. 
119 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery 
Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness 
of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 794 (discussing Judge Myron Bright’s 
observation that merely ordering disclosure as a sanction for discovery misconduct is 
ineffective because “it does little good to merely order a litigant to do what he should have 
done four months before”). 
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defense will be required to spend additional time, money, and effort to 
make effective use of the new information (locating witnesses, hiring 
experts, seeking forensic testing, pursuing investigative leads).120  This, in 
turn, leads to the needless waste of judicial resources when courts must 
respond to additional motions and conduct evidentiary hearings stemming 
from the belated disclosure of exculpatory evidence.  Consequently, to 
create a strong disincentive for prosecutors to suppress Brady evidence, and 
to prevent this needless waste of time and resources in the criminal justice 
system, courts must do more than grant a continuance of the trial date to 
redress Brady misconduct.  
At the other end of the sanctions spectrum is the remedy of dismissal.  
Though dismissal of the indictment would be an effective sanction to deter 
prosecutors from suppressing Brady evidence and would adequately 
address the harm to defendants and the courts, dismissal is a “disfavored” or 
“drastic”121 sanction that is rarely imposed.122  Generally, courts will only 
dismiss criminal charges as a sanction for Brady violations when there is a 
pattern of egregious Brady violations or when Brady evidence has been 
permanently lost or destroyed by the government.123  While some state 
court rules expressly allow for dismissal as a sanction for “particularly 
 
120 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 26.  Defense counsel stated: 
The efforts that were made by . . . the Defense in this case to obtain discovery and Brady 
material are unprecedented . . . .  [O]f the thousands of hours we spent defending Ted Stevens, I 
would estimate that 25 percent to a third of the time was focused on things we shouldn’t have 
had to ask for, discovery and Brady material time and time again. 
121 Id.; People v. Kelly, 467 N.E.2d 498, 501 (N.Y. 1984) (finding a discovery violation 
and stating “as a general matter the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where 
less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence”); see e.g., People v. 
Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999) (holding that dismissal was not an appropriate sanction where witness suffered 
memory loss but court permitted the introduction of prior statements at trial).  
122 JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS 5-109 
(4th ed. 2008) (stating that counsel may expect dismissal of charges to be rare and that the 
more expected procedure will be the exclusion of certain evidence or the granting of a 
continuance).  See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5.22, 
at 5-43 to -45 (2d ed. 2008) (supplemented annually) (stating that the court exceeds its 
authority in granting dismissal as a sanction for Brady violation where a less severe sanction 
could have cured the violation).  
123 United States v. Pollock, 417 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Mass. 1976) (emphasizing that 
dismissal was the only adequate sanction when notes that may have corroborated the defense 
theory that the defendant was working undercover as an agent for a government agency were 
intentionally destroyed in bad faith); Jones, supra note 115, at 2916 n.146 (citing numerous 
cases where courts found dismissal warranted due to destruction of Brady evidence or 
“flagrant” Brady violations); see also Ferrera v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(affirming district court’s motion to vacate defendant’s conviction under the federal RICO 
statute based on prosecutor’s failure to disclose a key witness’s recantation).  
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egregious” Brady violations,124 other jurisdictions prohibit dismissal as “too 
severe” of a sanction for Brady misconduct.125  Thus, absent extreme 
facts,126 courts very rarely dismiss a criminal case due to Brady 
 
124 See DIST. MASS. LOCAL R. 1.3 (“Failure to comply with any of the directions or 
obligations set forth in, or authorized by, these Local Rules may result in dismissal, default, 
or the imposition of other sanctions as deemed appropriate by the judicial officer.”); ME. R. 
CRIM. P. 16(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-910(a)(3b) (2009); see also Brady Report, 
supra note 35, at 60. 
125 Brady Report, supra note 35, at 60; e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 729.5(A) 
(2009) (“If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply with this Chapter or with an order issued pursuant 
to this Chapter, the court may . . . enter such other order, other than dismissal, as may be 
appropriate.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Davis, 578 F.2d 277, 279-80 (10th Cir. 
1978) (holding that new trial, not dismissal, is remedy for suppression of Brady evidence); 
People v. Wimberly, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“Even where the 
prosecution acts willfully and in bad faith . . . ‘the extreme sanction of dismissal is rarely 
appropriate unless a defendant has established prejudice . . . and the prejudice cannot be 
otherwise cured . . . .’”); Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001) (holding that 
dismissal of charges was extreme and inappropriate sanction for Brady violation). 
126 The 2007 campus shooting at Delaware State University (DSU) is one recent example 
of a dismissal based on Brady violations.  Order upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Delaware v. Braden, No. 0709030642 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19, 2009) [hereinafter Braden 
Order] (on file with author).  On September 21, 2007, shots were fired at a group of students 
leaving a DSU campus eatery, leaving one student dead and another student injured.  The 
investigation eventually led to the arrest of a DSU student, Loyer Braden, who was charged 
with second-degree murder and a series of assault and gun charges.  The government alleged 
that Braden fired the shots to retaliate against a DSU student in the crowd with whom he had 
a dispute.  Malcolm McQuiston, another DSU student present in the crowd when the shots 
were fired, was interviewed by police and later gave a statement exonerating Braden and 
identifying two other people as the shooters.  Id.  According to the government, although the 
police turned McQuiston’s statement over to the prosecutors one month after the shooting, 
prosecutors never listened to or viewed the tape and were unaware of its content until they 
began preparing for trial.  State’s Answer to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Delaware v. 
Braden, No. 0709030642 (Del. Super. Ct. April 14, 2009).  Thus, despite written defense 
requests for disclosure of Brady evidence in December 2007 and June 2008, the McQuiston 
statement was not disclosed to the defense until April 2009, the eve of trial when jury 
selection was about to begin, and only after disclosure was ordered by the court.  Braden 
Order, supra, at 2-3.  By the time of the belated disclosure, McQuiston could not be located, 
despite a month-long search by both the defense and the prosecution.  The trial judge granted 
the defense motion to dismiss based on the government’s loss of Brady evidence.  Braden 
Order, supra, at 8.  Although McQuiston was subsequently located, the government opted 
not to appeal the trial judge’s ruling.  The government stated that its decision not to appeal 
was based, in part, on the fact that a “key” prosecution witness had recanted his original 
statement implicating Braden in the shooting.  Inexplicably, the government also failed to 
inform the defense about this second piece of exculpatory information.  See Media Release, 
Del. Dep’t of Justice, Delaware Department of Justice Announces Appellate Decision in 
Criminal Case Against Defendant Loyer Braden (May 28, 2009), available at 
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/media/releases/2009/appelatedecisioncriminalcase.pdf; 
Dismissed Charges Against N.J. Man Accused in Delaware State Shooting Will Not Be 
Appealed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/ 
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misconduct.127  Although legal scholars and jurists have proposed Brady 
reforms that strongly encourage the expanded use of dismissal as a sanction 
for intentional violations, those reforms have not been adopted by state and 
federal courts.128 
While it is well settled that state and federal courts have the power to 
impose a wide range of sanctions for Brady violations, courts have not 
developed effective sanctions that fall between the minimal sanction of 
compelled disclosure and the maximum sanction of dismissal.  Even though 
all state courts have specific court rules and statutes that govern and 
regulate the disclosure of Brady evidence,129 state laws are silent on the 
specific sanctions to be imposed for noncompliance with the Brady 
disclosure duty.130  Instead, both state and federal courts have relied upon 
the discovery sanctions in Rule 16(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or its state law equivalent.  Rule 16 authorizes a court to sanction 
discovery violations by ordering disclosure, precluding evidence, granting a 
continuance, or entering “any other order that is just under the 
circumstances.”131  As discussed below, a strongly worded instruction that 
 
2009/05/del_attorney_general_will_not.html; Murder Case Against Suspected Delaware 
University Shooter Dismissed, FOXNEWS.COM, May 19, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,520723,00.html. 
127 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 611 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (granting new 
trial when district attorney kept exculpatory statement for over a year until the day before 
trial when witness could no longer be found). 
128 E.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 100, at 120 (proposing the codification 
of the Brady disclosure duty in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and advocating 
“dismissal of an indictment for failure to comply with Rule 16 upon a showing of substantial 
prejudice to the defendant or intentional misconduct by the government”); see also Cicchini, 
supra note 111, at 336 (proposing rule requiring automatic mistrial for prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial and proposing dismissal with prejudice for intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct).  But see Peter Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional 
Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 827 (1999) (arguing that dismissal of charges should not 
be available simply to deter prosecutorial misconduct and stating that courts “should not rely 
on granting a particular defendant relief to serve as a check on future prosecutorial actions in 
other cases except to the extent necessary to vindicate a specific constitutional protection 
breached by the prosecutorial misconduct. . . .  [C]onstitutional protections belong to 
individuals, not to courts for use as a means to police the conduct of prosecutors.”). 
129 See Brady Report, supra note 35, at 49-59. 
130 Id. at 59-60. 
131 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) states: 
If a party fails to comply with this rule, the court may: (A) order that party to permit the 
discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and 
conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed 
evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances. 
Many state rules parallel the federal rule.  See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.5; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 
19.7(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n)(1); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(i); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(i); 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 729.5(A); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03(8); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(1); 
2010] A Reason to Doubt 447 
informs the jury that the government intentionally suppressed favorable 
evidence should be included among the sanctions that is “just under the 
circumstances” to redress intentional Brady violations. 
B.  AN ALTERNATIVE SANCTION: THE “BRADY INSTRUCTION” 
Informing the jury of the government’s intentional suppression of 
Brady evidence is an appropriate “middle ground” sanction between simple 
disclosure and complete dismissal.  The proposed “Brady instruction” is 
closely akin to adverse inference instructions, also known as “missing 
evidence” or “spoliation” instructions.  Those specially crafted instructions 
are traditionally used by courts to address evidentiary imbalances created 
when discoverable or admissible evidence is suspiciously lost or 
inexplicably destroyed while in the exclusive possession of an adverse 
party.132  Commonly, adverse inference instructions inform jurors that they 
are permitted to infer that if the absent evidence had been produced at trial, 
it would have been damaging to the party responsible for its loss.133 
 
WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(i).  Beyond the Rule 16(d) enumerated sanctions, a 
handful of states expressly permit courts to impose additional sanctions, including contempt 
or an assessment of costs incurred by opposing party for willful violations.  See, e.g., ARK. 
R. CRIM. P. 19.7(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n)(2); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(ii); ILL. SUP. CT. 
R. 415(G)(II); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 729.5(B) (providing that willful violation of 
discovery rule “shall be deemed constructive contempt of court”); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03(8); 
VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(2); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(ii); see also Brady Report, 
supra note 35, at 60 n.136. 
132 See State v. Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999) (“When police negligently fail 
to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, an instruction . . . permits the jury to infer that 
the evidence would have been exculpatory.”); State v. Willits, 393 P.2d 274, 276, 279 (Ariz. 
1964) (ordering the trial court on remand to give an adverse inference instruction as a 
sanction for the government’s Brady misconduct and stating that the unfavorable inference 
may be sufficient to “create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt”); People v. 
Wimberly, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 162-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that trial court properly 
gave jury remedial instruction that improper destruction of evidence by prosecution could 
support inference adverse to prosecution which might be sufficient to raise reasonable 
doubt); State v. Maniccia, 355 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the defendant’s 
right to due process was violated due to the state’s destruction of evidence and imposing an 
adverse inference instruction); Tinsley v. Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1989) (citing 
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Ky. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 892 
S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1994)) (declaring that a “missing evidence instruction” likely would be 
sufficient to “offset the prosecutor’s misconduct”). 
133 See generally David J. Kessler, Spoliation in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings: 
Theory of Spoliation In Habeas Corpus—Part I, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 14, 16.  See also 
Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and 
the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 293-94 nn.396-97 (2008) (collecting 
cases both demanding and relaxing the requirement of proof of bad faith or intentional 
destruction of evidence as a prerequisite for an adverse inference instruction). 
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While adverse inference instructions are most commonly given when 
evidence has been permanently lost, trial judges have infrequently 
employed the instructions to redress Brady misconduct.  In People v. 
Jackson,134 the court imposed an adverse inference instruction following the 
government’s intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence.  The three 
defendants were on trial for a triple homicide that occurred inside an 
apartment.  Shortly after the crime, the police interviewed a witness, 
Nicholas Taylor, and memorialized his oral statement.  Thereafter, Taylor 
gave a sworn statement to the prosecutor.  In both statements, Taylor stated 
that he was in the hallway outside of the apartment when the victims were 
shot and he saw one of the victims open the apartment door after the 
defendant departed the premises.  Taylor stated that he saw the defendant 
standing outside of the apartment building at the time the victims were 
killed in the apartment.  For three years, the government did not disclose 
Taylor’s exculpatory statements to the defense.  Due to his severe learning 
disabilities, Taylor was unable to recall any of the critical details of his 
earlier statements by the time of trial.  The court found that the 
government’s failure to make timely disclosure of Taylor’s “extremely 
exculpatory” statement was intentional and prejudicial to the defense.135  
The court also found that sanctions were warranted because the government 
was well aware of the fact that Taylor’s disability created “a high 
probability of failing memory.”136  The court denied a defense request for 
dismissal but permitted the defense to introduce Taylor’s two pretrial 
statements, and it ruled that “the jury will be provided with an adverse 
inference charge regarding the Brady violation by the People.”137 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide additional support for 
the use of a Brady instruction to redress the intentional suppression of 
Brady evidence.  Rule 37 empowers the court to impose sanctions on civil 
litigants and specifically authorizes the court to “inform the jury of the 
party’s failure” to disclose discoverable material.138  Rule 37 was amended 
 
134 People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
135 Id. at 189-91.  The government admitted that it was aware of the statement but argued 
that Taylor’s statement did not fall within Brady because there were several inconsistencies 
in Taylor’s statements, and the government did not consider them credible.  Id. at 186-87.  
The court summarily rejected this contention as “disingenuous” and found that the 
exculpatory value of Taylor’s statements “is evident on its face” without regard to the 
prosecutor’s unilateral assessment of the credibility of the witness’s account. 
136 Id. at 190. 
137 Id. at 191. 
138 Rule 37(c)(1)(B) provides that where a party “fails to provide information or identify 
a witness,” the court can employ a wide range of sanctions, including “inform[ing] the jury 
of the party’s failure.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(B); see Tarlton v. Cumberland County Corr. 
Facility, 192 F.R.D. 165 (D.N.J. 2000) (discussing discovery obligations in civil cases and 
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to include the jury instruction sanction in order to enhance the court’s 
power to enforce the disclosure duties imposed on civil litigants.139  
Specifically, the Advisory Committee noted: 
Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclosure of 
information that, being supportive of the position of the opposing party, might 
advantageously be concealed by the disclosing party.  However, the rule provides for 
a wide range of other sanctions—such as . . . allowing the jury to be informed of the 
fact of nondisclosure—that . . . can be imposed when found to be warranted after a 
hearing.140 
Rule 37 should be instructive to trial judges in criminal cases seeking 
to impose meaningful sanctions for noncompliance with Brady disclosure 
duties.  The practical recognition in the civil rules that strong sanctions are 
necessary to ensure the disclosure of unfavorable information that might 
“advantageously be concealed” by a litigant mirrors the concerns over 
nondisclosure of Brady evidence.  As a matter of policy, if adverse 
inference instructions have been expressly adopted as a sanction in civil 
cases in which the verdict will, at most, cause a litigant to suffer pecuniary 
losses, there is no principled justification for not imposing the sanction in 
criminal cases in which the verdict could result in a loss of liberty or life.  
Recognizing the disparity between the higher standards imposed upon civil 
litigants than imposed upon the government in criminal cases, one judge 
remarked, “Surely if that rule is to be invoked to protect the pocketbook of 
an insurance company it should be invoked in the instant case to protect 
natural persons from being sent to jail unjustly.”141 
 
the mandatory nature of Rule 37 sanctions).  The jury instruction sanction was imposed by 
the court in McCloud v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd., No. 04-1118, 2007 
WL 2584289, at *5 (D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2007), where the court found that the defendant’s 
response to discovery was “at best deliberately misleading and at worst a deliberate attempt 
to hide the identity of a damning witness.”  See also Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 508 
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that destruction of the evidence “requires a jury instruction on 
the spoliation inference”); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 
§ 7:2 (stating that in Slessinger v. Walt Disney Corp., Case No. BC 022365 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
June 16, 2000), the trial judge instructed the jury that it “may infer that Disney willfully 
suppressed evidence in order to prevent such evidence from being presented in this trial and 
the jury may consider that fact in determining what inferences to draw from the evidence”). 
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment. 
140 Id. 
141 See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d 631, 658 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the court for finding harmless improper statements made by the 
prosecutor at trial and noting that similar conduct would have been reversible error in a civil 
case). 
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1.  The Formulation of the Brady Instruction 
In recent years, a few legal scholars and jurists have proposed greater 
use of adverse inference instructions to sanction discovery misconduct in 
both civil and criminal cases.142 
One instruction specifically designed to address Brady violations 
would inform the jury as follows: 
[i]n this case, the government failed to turn over promptly, as required by law, a piece 
of evidence favorable to the defense, namely [evidence], of which the defense learned 
only on [date], when [means of disclosure].  Although this delay does not necessarily 
bear on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you may, if you think it appropriate in 
light of all the evidence, take into account the possible harm to the defense caused by 
this delay when evaluating whether the government has proven the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.143 
The strength of this instruction is in the clarity with which it conveys 
the government’s disclosure duty and its breach of that duty.  Both of those 
components are essential for a jury to appreciate fully the significance of 
the government’s Brady violation.  The weakness of this instruction, 
however, is that it does not go far enough.  The instruction fails to inform 
the jury that the government’s misconduct was intentional and not the result 
of an innocent or careless oversight.  This fact underscores the significance 
of the government’s misconduct.  Also, the instruction directs the jury to 
gauge the possible harm or prejudice to the defense caused by the 
withholding of the evidence.  However, in finding that the government 
violated Brady, the trial judge necessarily would have made that 
determination in finding that the withheld evidence met the Brady 
materiality requirement.  Thus, allowing the jury to assess whether the 
defense was prejudiced by the Brady violation is misdirected.  The 
 
142 Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 
1459 (2006); see also TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 26-27 
(recommending the use of a jury instruction sanction for Brady violations); Imwinkleried, 
supra note 119, at 793-96 (advocating for broader use of litigating discovery violations at 
trial as a sanction for discovery misconduct by litigants). 
143 Dewar, supra note 142, at 1457.  Brady instructions have also been proposed by other 
legal scholars.  See, e.g., 3 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & WILLIAM C. LEE, 
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 104.27 (5th ed. 2000) (“If you should find that 
a party willfully [suppressed] [hid] [destroyed] evidence in order to prevent its being 
presented in this trial, you may consider such [suppression] [hiding] [destruction] in 
determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case.”); 4 THOM 
LUNDY, THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMPENDIUM § 36.1.2 (2008), 
available at http://www.juryinstruction.com/toc.shtml (password and paid registration 
required) (“If you find that the [government] attempted to suppress evidence in any manner, 
you may draw an adverse inference to the prosecution.  Such an adverse inference may be 
sufficient, alone or in combination with other matters, for you to have a reasonable doubt as 
to defendant’s guilt.”). 
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language of this instruction simply lacks the power to serve as an effective 
sanction that will deter Brady misconduct. 
A more appropriate Brady instruction would focus the jury’s attention 
on what weight, if any, it might choose to give the government’s conduct in 
its determination of whether the government has proven guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A jury should be told, plainly and clearly, that the 
government’s intentional nondisclosure of favorable evidence was wrong.  
A jury should also be told that it may draw a permissive inference regarding 
the connection between the government’s misconduct and whether the 
government has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The language of 
the Brady instruction should deter prosecutors from withholding Brady 
evidence in order to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation.  Under the 
current state of the law, prosecutors can perform their own private cost-
benefit analysis to determine whether suppression of Brady evidence is 
“worth the risk” of any sanctions.  This cost-benefit calculation is greatly 
informed by the improbability that the suppressed evidence will ever be 
discovered, the remote possibility that there will be any adverse 
consequences to the government’s case, and the unlikely prospect that the 
individual prosecutor will be held accountable.  The prosecutor is forced to 
make a very different calculation, however, if a presumptive consequence 
of intentional Brady misconduct is an instruction to the jury that places the 
government in a disadvantageous position, shifting the tactical advantage of 
nondisclosure to the defense.  The threat of such a sanction would make the 
suppression of evidence a far riskier proposition and would cause 
prosecutors to correctly err on the side of disclosure.144  A punitive Brady 
instruction that comprehensively addresses all of these concerns would be 
the following: 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Under the United States Constitution, in order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, 
the government is required to inform the defense of any information known to the 
government that tends to suggest the defendant might not have committed the crime(s) 
charged as well as information that casts doubt on the credibility of the government’s 
own evidence.  In this case, the government intentionally withheld such evidence from 
the defense.  Specifically, the government failed to inform the defense that [   ].  In 
evaluating the merits of this case, you can decide what weight, if any, to give to the 
government’s misconduct.  The government’s actions, standing alone, or in 
combination with other facts presented in this case, may create a reasonable doubt in 
your mind about the defendant’s guilt. 
 
144 Dewar, supra note 142, at 1462-65 (stating that “the very existence of the [jury 
instruction] remedy would cause prosecutors to take more care in carrying out their Brady 
duties out of heightened fear of imperiling their convictions” and that “if prosecutors do 
suffer lost convictions, jury nullification, or public outcry, [they may be provoked to 
improve the delivery of Brady information]”). 
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This proposed instruction explains what is required under Brady and 
why disclosure is important (and not a mere “technicality”).  This 
instruction also explains exactly what the government did wrong and 
appropriately allows the jury to decide the significance of the misconduct.  
While this instruction will not be outcome determinative in every case (nor 
should it be), the instruction will likely have a greater impact if the jury 
finds that the Brady evidence is central to the guilt/innocence 
determination.  Conversely, the Brady instruction will have less impact if 
the jury believes the government, notwithstanding the Brady violation, has 
presented compelling evidence of guilt. 
2.  The Limitations of the “Brady Instruction” Sanction 
The Brady instruction sanction is not a panacea for all Brady 
violations.  Even if the court finds that the prosecutor intentionally 
suppressed material exculpatory or impeachment evidence, the trial court’s 
decision to impose this particular sanction is completely discretionary.145  
Without a statute or court rule, the defense would not have a right to a 
Brady instruction as a remedy.  Moreover, the Brady instruction would only 
be as effective as the language used by the court to convey the severity of 
the violation and explain the nexus between the government’s misconduct 
and the burden of proof.  The exact language of jury instructions is 
generally left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.146  The court could, 
therefore, adopt a very weak instruction that would have little impact on the 
jury and no deterrent effect upon prosecutors.147  
 
145 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 77:272 (West 2009) (stating that the trial judge has 
discretion as to the style, form, and language of jury instructions, and the judge’s 
formulation of the instructions will be reversed only upon a showing of prejudice); AM. JUR. 
TRIAL § 921 (West 2007) (noting that trial judges make the decision whether to give a jury 
instruction and which instruction to give, and such decisions may not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion); see, e.g., State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Short, 459 N.W.2d 111 
(Minn. 1990) (noting that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining jury 
instructions). 
146 See 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 145, § 77:272 (noting that while the parties 
are entitled to jury instructions which reflect correct legal standards, they are not entitled to 
instructions phrased exactly as they desire); see also John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-
Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that jury instruction could be 
overturned only if a party’s substantial rights are prejudiced, and the instruction misleads the 
jury or misstates the correct legal standard). 
147 The efficacy of using adverse inference instructions to punish and deter discovery 
misconduct has drawn criticism from some legal scholars.  Nance, supra note 114, at 1.  
Recently, Professor Nance has urged the complete elimination of adverse inference 
instructions in most cases.  Professor Nance contends that reliance on adverse inference 
instructions is misplaced, because it is the role of the court—not the jury—to manage 
evidence, set discovery standards for litigants, and apply discipline when there are discovery 
abuses by litigants.  Nance argues that what jurors actually do when given an adverse 
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On balance, the use of a stern, carefully crafted Brady instruction 
could simultaneously address the harms occasioned by intentional Brady 
misconduct and provide the desired benefits of a Brady sanction, including 
the amelioration of the harm suffered by the defendant, vindication of the 
integrity of the court, and deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct. 
IV.  INTENTIONAL BRADY MISCONDUCT AND THE “CONSCIOUSNESS OF A 
WEAK CASE” INFERENCE 
Independent of the trial judge’s decision to impose a strongly worded 
Brady instruction as a sanction for Brady misconduct, evidence of 
intentional Brady misconduct is admissible at trial to show that the 
government’s case is weak.148  Under well-established principles of 
evidence, the government’s intentional suppression of evidence gives rise to 
an inference that the prosecutor engaged in obstructionist misconduct, 
because she knew that the government’s case was weak and would be 
further weakened by the presentation of the Brady evidence at trial.  That 
subjective assessment by the trial prosecutor—the person in the best 
possible position to know the merits of the government’s evidence—
permits the inference that the government’s case is, in fact, weak.149  Given 
that the government has the burden of proof in a criminal case and must 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence that the government’s case 
is weak is relevant to whether the government can meet its burden.  
Moreover, the fact that the Brady evidence was eventually disclosed to the 
defense and made available for use at trial does not diminish the evidentiary 
value of the government’s conduct in withholding critical evidence. 
 
inference instruction is decide whether the litigant’s discovery misconduct warrants 
“increasing the burden of persuasion” to the point where the litigant loses.  While Professor 
Nance correctly identifies some of the weaknesses of adverse inference instructions, these 
concerns must yield in the face of intentional Brady misconduct that poses a far greater 
threat to the integrity of the adjudication process and results in the wrongful conviction of 
innocent people. 
148 In Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009), discussed in greater detail in 
Part IV, infra, the court noted the distinction between the admission of Brady misconduct as 
a sanction for a Brady violation and the presentation of Brady misconduct as “substantive 
evidence” that the government’s case is weak.  Id. at 11 n.15. 
149 Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The prosecutor, more than 
neutral jurists, can better perceive the weakness of the state’s case.”); United States v. Boyd, 
55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the prosecutors did not think their case air tight (and so 
they tried to improperly bolster it), this is some indication that it was indeed not airtight.”); 
see also United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the 
prosecutor’s bad faith in suppressing Brady evidence “could shed some light on whether the 
prosecution thought the evidence was valuable to the defendants”); United States v. Jackson, 
780 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1986) (“We are doubtful that any prosecutor would in bad 
faith act to suppress evidence unless he or she believed it could affect the outcome of the 
trial.”). 
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To fully appreciate the evidentiary significance of Brady misconduct 
evidence, one need only look at a criminal case from the perspective of the 
prosecutor who believes the government has strong evidence of guilt and 
can prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecutor 
who is confident that the government will prevail at trial has no incentive to 
withhold Brady evidence in violation of the constitutionally mandated 
disclosure duty.  Instead, upon learning of the Brady evidence, the 
prosecutor would disclose the evidence to the defense and use the 
considerable investigative resources of the police department, the forensic 
skill and technology of the crime lab, and the subpoena power of the grand 
jury to refute the Brady evidence at trial.150  The prosecutor who knows the 
government’s case is strong and strives to “do justice” and not merely “seek 
convictions” is well-positioned to thoroughly investigate the Brady 
evidence and eliminate any lingering doubts about the defendant’s 
innocence. 
By contrast, the prosecutor who believes that the government’s case is 
weak has a powerful incentive to withhold Brady evidence to ensure victory 
at trial.  If the prosecutor has accurately evaluated the merits of the 
government’s case and determined that the government does not have 
compelling evidence of guilt, the Brady evidence presents a serious 
impediment to securing a conviction.  The intentional nondisclosure of 
Brady evidence, therefore, is an attempt to engineer a guilty verdict in a 
weak case by concealing evidence that would, by definition, significantly 
bolster the defense case or seriously undermine the government’s case.151  
While there may be other reasons for the nondisclosure of Brady evidence, 
the defense has a right to present the evidence of Brady misconduct at trial 
in support of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.  In rebuttal, the 
government can present evidence to support an alternative explanation for 
its conduct.152 
 
150 See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 n.9, 480 (1973) (noting that the “virtually 
limitless resources of government investigators” give the government “inherent information 
gathering advantages,” including the power to interrogate, obtain search warrants, and issue 
subpoenas to the grand jury); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: 
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1182-83 (1960) (stating that 
the state has far superior resources, whereas the defendant has “neither a crime laboratory 
nor vast identification and fingerprint files available to him”). 
151 Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241 (stating that a Brady violation may support an inference that 
“the prosecutors resorted to improper tactics because they were justifiably fearful that 
without such tactics the defendants might be acquitted”); see also Conley v. United States, 
415 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2005). 
152 See infra note 193 (discussing cases regarding a party’s right to present evidence to 
rebut the “consciousness of a weak case” inference). 
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Accordingly, when the government intentionally withholds Brady 
evidence, the defense is entitled to present the facts surrounding the 
government’s Brady misconduct at trial and receive the full evidentiary 
benefit of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference, including 
presentation of facts related to the government’s awareness of the Brady 
evidence and the measures taken by the government to prevent its 
disclosure to the defense. 
In the few cases that have addressed the admissibility of Brady 
misconduct evidence at trial in support of the “consciousness of a weak 
case” inference, trial judges have used the rules of evidence to exclude 
Brady misconduct evidence on the grounds that the evidence was not 
relevant153 or was unfairly prejudicial.154  As discussed below, such rulings 
are incorrect.  Evidence of intentional Brady misconduct meets the 
evidentiary standards of admissibility, and the blanket exclusion of such 
evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. 
A.  THE RELEVANCE OF BRADY MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 
Relevance is the starting point for determining the admissibility of a 
proffered piece of evidence.  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant 
evidence is any evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”155  
Evidence of Brady misconduct meets the standard of relevance.  As John 
Henry Wigmore stated: 
[i]t has always been understood—the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in 
human experience—that a party’s falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and 
presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or 
spoliation, and all similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his 
consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness 
may be inferred the fact itself of the cause’s lack of truth and merit.  The inference 
 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 983 A.2d 363, 368 (D.C. 2009) (sustaining 
prosecutor’s relevance objection to the admissibility of evidence that Brady material was 
intentionally suppressed by the government prior to trial) (discussed infra at notes 211-225 
and accompanying text); Barnes v. State, 462 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. App. 1985) (upholding 
trial court’s ruling that defense evidence of the prosecutor’s attempts to intimidate defense 
witnesses was not admissible to show “the state’s lack of confidence in the strength of its 
case” because such evidence was not relevant to the defendant’s guilt and the witness was 
not actually intimidated into recanting his testimony). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defense 
contention that law enforcement officers’ conduct in trying to intimidate defense witnesses 
was admissible to show the weakness of the government’s case, and finding that evidence 
was properly excluded as unfairly prejudicial because, inter alia, the evidence would divert 
the jury’s attention to a collateral issue). 
155 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, 
indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his 
cause.156 
Other scholars characterize the “consciousness of a weak case” inference as 
a party’s “admission by conduct.”  According to McCormick: 
[a]s might be expected, wrongdoing by the party in connection with its case 
amounting to an obstruction of justice is also commonly regarded as an admission by 
conduct.  By resorting to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for 
believing that he or she thinks the case is weak and not to be won by fair means, or in 
criminal cases that the accused is conscious of guilt.157 
The “consciousness of a weak case” inference recognizes that certain 
behavior by a litigant bespeaks a subjective awareness of legal liability.  If a 
litigant is aware that his case has no merit and is not likely to succeed at 
trial, the self-preservation instinct will cause him to take actions that one 
would expect of a person seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of 
litigation.  In civil cases, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference has 
been applied to a wide array of misconduct, including the destruction and 
suppression of evidence.158  The inference has also been applied against 
governmental entities in civil litigation.159 
 
156 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 2 EVIDENCE § 278, at 133 (James Harmon Chadborn ed., 
Little, Brown 1979) (1940) (emphasis added); see also 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 535 (2008) 
(collecting cases on the consciousness of a weak case inference that flows from suppression, 
alteration, or fabrication of evidence); Evidence—Admissibility of Attempts by a Party to 
Suppress Evidence, 9 TEX. L. REV. 79, 100 (1930) (stating that it has “long been recognized” 
that a party’s misconduct in manipulating evidence is admissible as indicating a 
“consciousness of the weakness of his case,’” and citing cases from the 1800s that applied 
the inference to the fabrication, suppression, or destruction of evidence). 
157 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 203 (John William Strong, ed., 1999).  See 
generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government 
Have to Eat Its Words?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 401, 402 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of 
pretrial statements made by the prosecutor or members of the prosecution team that are 
inconsistent with the government evidence at trial as admissions by party opponent). 
158 E.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Horab, 309 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1962) (recognizing 
that a litigant’s attempt to prevent service of subpoena on a witness could support the 
consciousness of a weak case inference); Scrivner v. Am. Car & Foundry, 50 S.W.2d 1001, 
1016 (Mo. 1932) (considering an attempt to bribe a witness to be “an admission, 
circumstantial in its nature, that the plaintiff at the time of this offer was conscious of the 
weakness of his cause.”); see also Nowack v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 32 (N.Y. 1901).  
See generally Michael J. Hunter, 2004-2005 Evidence, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1075, 1095-96 
(2004) (discussing the use of the consciousness of a weak case inference in New York civil 
cases). 
159 E.g., District of Columbia v. Perez, 694 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1997) (noting that the 
alteration of medical records following patient’s death gave rise to the consciousness of a 
weak case inference and permitted the jury to resolve factual issues against the government); 
Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. App. 1985) (stating that the county 
government’s action in altering evidence to conceal a defect “may be taken as an indication 
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In criminal cases, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference is 
almost exclusively used by the government to show that the defendant has a 
“guilty mind” or as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.  
Evidence of a criminal defendant’s consciousness of guilt has been so 
widely accepted that admissibility is regarded as “universally conceded.”160  
Such evidence generally falls into two categories.  The first category 
includes actions taken by the defendant after the crime to elude capture, 
such as flight from the scene of the crime, escape from custody, alteration 
of physical appearance, use of an alias, and false exculpatory statements to 
the police.161  The second category of consciousness of guilt evidence 
involves various acts of evidence manipulation by the defendant that are 
closely analogous to actions that would constitute Brady misconduct, 
including the subornation of perjury, bribery or attempted bribery of 
witnesses,162 or the destruction or concealment of incriminating evidence.163 
While it is “universally conceded” that the defendant’s conduct in 
manipulating and suppressing evidence is admissible to establish the 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt, there are a very few criminal cases 
applying the “consciousness of a weak case” inference to similar acts of 
 
of consciousness of the weakness of the county’s case and a belief that its defense would not 
prevail without the aid of such improper tactics”). 
160 WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 276 at 122 (“It is universally conceded today that the 
fact of an accused flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption 
of a false name and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, 
and thus guilt itself.”). 
161 Id. 
162 See, e.g., State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1041-44 (Conn. 2003) (writing a letter 
offering money in exchange for an alibi); People v. Leyra, 134 N.E.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. 1956) 
(offering a false alibi); State v. Melson, 56 P.2d 710, 711 (Wash. 1936) (attempting to pay 
witness $500 to withdraw allegation). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1497-98 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing 
government to introduce the fact that defendant attempted to conceal evidence by shoving it 
into his sock as consciousness of guilt); United States ex rel. Foster v. DeRobertis, 741 F.2d 
1007, 1014 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant’s concealment of the body in a murder 
case supports a consciousness of guilt inference that defendant was responsible for death of 
the deceased); State v. Denis, 622 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision to admit a torn check, even though it served as evidence of another crime, 
because it showed that defendant had attempted to destroy evidence, demonstrating 
consciousness of guilt); State v. Broadhurst, 196 P.2d 407, 430 (Or. 1948) (finding that 
repeated incidents of defendant’s fabrication, suppression, and destruction of evidence in a 
murder case were admissible as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt).  See generally 
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1017 (2008) (collecting cases on circumstantial evidence of 
consciousness of guilt based on the suppression, destruction, or fabrication of evidence); Dan 
Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at “Consciousness of Guilt” 
Evidence, 2005 ARMY LAW. 54 (stating that the admissibility of evidence of the destruction 
and concealment of incriminating evidence by the defense has long been and continues to be 
competent evidence in both federal and military courts). 
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evidence suppression by the government in violation of Brady.  In pre-
Brady cases, courts acknowledged that government actions amounting to 
evidence obstruction are admissible to support the “consciousness of a 
weak case” inference.  In United States v. Remington,164 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the defense was entitled to adduce evidence at 
trial that the prosecutor called witnesses before the grand jury in an effort to 
intimidate them.  While the court rejected the defense contention that the 
witnesses’ testimony should be stricken, the court stated that the evidence 
of witness intimidation by the government could properly be explored by 
the defense on cross-examination and “brought out as part of the defense 
evidence which goes to the jury.”165  The court reasoned that such evidence, 
if proven, would constitute “affirmative evidence of the weakness of the 
prosecution’s case.”166 
Similarly, in United States v. Graham,167 a government witness 
testified that his testimony at prior trials was false and induced by promises 
of executive clemency by government agents.  The court acknowledged that 
if such evidence of government misconduct was believed, “the jury would 
have had reason enough for concluding that the prosecutor was conscious 
that his case against appellants was lacking in merit and that they were 
innocent men unjustly accused.”168  The court further stated that the same 
presumption that arises against a party who withholds or destroys evidence 
“is equally applicable to the prosecution of a criminal charge.”169 
Although both Remington and Graham were decided well before the 
Court’s decision in Brady, the prosecutor’s misconduct in both cases fall 
squarely within the scope of the Brady disclosure duty.170  Post-Brady, 
however, there are few cases regarding the use of Brady misconduct 
evidence at trial to support the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.171  
 
164 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951). 
165 Id. at 251 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 278). 
166 Id. 
167 102 F.2d 436 (2d. Cir. 1939). 
168 Id. at 442. 
169 Id. at 442-43; see also Commonwealth v. Enwright, 156 N.E. 65, 67 (Mass. 1927) 
(“[I]f the district attorney should unfairly suppress evidence he would thereby subject the 
case of the commonwealth to the same adverse inferences as would result from similar 
conduct by another party to the same cause.”). 
170 See supra notes 46 and 48 (citing cases finding Brady violations based on witness 
coercion and the presentation of false testimony). 
171 E.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009) (discussed infra Part V); 
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 
35, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 996-97 (D.C. 1992) 
(citing WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 278, and stating that “the persuasive force of the entire 
prosecution case might have been impaired or undermined if exculpatory evidence had been 
presented at trial.”). 
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In a handful of cases, courts have found that the prosecutor’s intentional or 
bad faith suppression of Brady evidence gave rise to an inference that the 
suppressed evidence was material.  In Silva v. Brown,172 the government 
made a plea deal with its star witness in exchange for testimony against the 
defendant.  As part of the plea, the witness was required to refrain from 
undergoing psychiatric treatment for his mental condition prior to testifying 
in the case.  The court found that this deal evinced the prosecution’s 
concerns regarding the mental state of the witness and should have been 
disclosed to the defense as impeachment under Brady.  The court found that 
the fact that the government went to such extremes showed that even the 
prosecution viewed the witness’ testimony “with some doubt.”173  
Significantly, the court noted that “the prosecutor’s own conduct in keeping 
the deal secret underscores the deal’s importance.”174  In rejecting the 
government’s contention that its nondisclosure of the secret deal did not 
meet the Brady materiality standard, the court stated that “[t]he Prosecutor’s 
actions can speak as loud as his words.”175  The court reasoned that “the 
State’s deliberate and strategic decision to make the deal and not to disclose 
it suggests the weakness of its post hoc claims that the evidence was 
irrelevant.”176 
Like the court in Silva, other courts have found that the intentional 
nature of the prosecutor’s actions in suppressing Brady evidence gives rise 
to an inference that the prosecutor believed the suppressed evidence was 
critically important in the case and met the Brady materiality standard.177  
Thus, despite the limited precedent and the scarcity of scholarly debate,178 
the “consciousness of a weak case” and the “materiality” inferences that 
courts have found to flow from the intentional nondisclosure of evidence by 
the government provide a solid foundation for finding that Brady 
misconduct evidence is relevant to support the “consciousness of a weak 
case” inference.  This inference is operable against plaintiffs and defendants 
in civil cases, against defendants in criminal cases, and against the 
government in civil cases.  To find that evidence of Brady misconduct is 
 
172 416 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005). 
173 Id. at 986. 
174 Id. at 990. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 E.g., United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1986). 
178 Several legal scholars have written extensively on the scope and limitations of 
discovery misconduct evidence.  See Nance, supra note 114; Imwinkelreid, supra note 119; 
John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
695 (1992).  However, their work has focused exclusively on civil cases and has not 
addressed the unique issues that arise in the context of Brady violations in criminal litigation. 
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not relevant when offered against the government in a criminal case would 
create a solitary exception to the general admissibility of a litigant’s 
intentional destruction of evidence in support of the “consciousness of a 
weak case” inference.   
In addition to the relevance of Brady misconduct evidence in support 
of a “consciousness of a weak case” inference, Brady misconduct evidence 
has particular relevance in cases in which the defense either mounts a 
challenge to the government’s criminal investigation or claims the 
prosecution is tainted by government misconduct or bias.  It is not 
uncommon in criminal litigation for the defense to elicit facts to illustrate 
that the government did not perform a thorough investigation of the crime.  
In Kyles, the Supreme Court noted that an attack by the defense on the 
thoroughness of the government’s investigation is a proper subject of 
inquiry at trial.179  In furtherance of this defense theory, defense attorneys 
commonly seek to show that the police officers handling the investigation 
failed to perform critical investigative tasks that could have yielded 
exculpatory physical evidence or that might have affirmatively identified 
another person as the perpetrator of the crime.180  As the Court noted in 
Kyles, “indications of conscientious police work will enhance probative 
force [of evidence] and slovenly work will diminish it.”181  Evidence that 
the government intentionally withheld Brady material can significantly 
bolster the defense theory that the government’s case is not built on the 
solid foundation of a conscientious investigation.  This defense strategy is 
often viewed as the desperate act of a guilty person attempting to escape 
responsibility by “putting the government on trial.”  But evidence of 
 
179 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995); see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 
593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 399 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Mass. 1980) 
(“The fact that certain tests were not conducted or certain police procedures not followed 
could raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt in the minds of the jurors.”); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Mass. 1979) (failure of government 
experts to perform state-of-the-art forensic tests admissible); Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 
628-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (failure to use audio and video equipment to document 
key information); People v. Marchese, 638 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. App. Div 1996) (discussing 
cross examination of police officers concerning their failure to use available investigative 
techniques); Workman v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 368, 378 (Va. 2006) (finding 
nondisclosure of favorable evidence violated Brady where evidence could have been used to 
“attack the reliability of the police investigation”). 
180 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 322-23 (2006) (noting that the defense 
criticized the procedures used in the collection and handling of fingerprint, fiber, and DNA 
evidence in support of the claim that law enforcement mishandled the investigation).  See 
generally, 1 DAVID E. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
COMMENTARY 2-196-200 (3d ed. 2009) (citing Maryland law for the proposition that the 
defense is entitled to comment on the absence of well-known and commonly available 
evidence like fingerprints). 
181 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446 n.15. 
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intentional Brady misconduct significantly bolsters the credibility of this 
defense theory because the jury learns that the government intentionally 
concealed exculpatory evidence and went to great lengths to keep the 
evidence hidden in violation of its disclosure duty.  This kind of purposeful 
misconduct lends credence to defense claims that the government might 
have “cut corners” or engaged in other acts of misconduct in the 
investigation and preparation of the case. 
Likewise, Brady misconduct evidence is particularly relevant in cases 
in which the defense contends that the government’s case is based, in whole 
or in part, on bias or other improper misconduct by members of the 
prosecution team.  Defenses grounded in wrongful government conduct 
include claims that the police fabricated or planted evidence or that law 
enforcement officers plotted to “frame” or falsely implicate the 
defendant.182  Also included in this category is the defense of entrapment,183 
claims of selective or discriminatory prosecution,184 and retaliatory or 
vindictive prosecution claims.185  Evidence of Brady misconduct makes it 
more probable that these other forms of misconduct occurred in the case.  
Frequently, when the defendant or a witness alleges coercion or 
intimidation by police, there are no other witnesses to the event and the jury 
is presented with a credibility contest between the defendant and the police 
 
182 See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 322-23 (noting that a major part of the defendant’s defense 
was that contaminated and planted evidence was used by law enforcement officers to 
purposely frame him for a crime that was actually committed by a third party). 
183 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1957) (concluding that the defense of 
entrapment is viable when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party 
and beguiles him into committing crimes which it otherwise would not have attempted”); 
United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that entrapment is a 
defense designed to prevent the conviction of the unwary innocent induced by government 
action to commit a crime and consists primarily of two elements: actions constituting 
inducement by the government and the absence of facts showing criminal predisposition of 
the defendant) (citing United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir.1992)).  See 
generally LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8, at 501-21 (4th ed. 2003). 
184 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (finding that claims of 
selective prosecution are grounded in the Equal Protection Clause and require the claimant to 
show: (1) that he was singled-out for prosecution while others similarly-situated where not 
prosecuted; and (2) the defendant was targeted for prosecution based on race, religion or 
some other impermissible basis); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (critiquing Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456). 
185 Vindictive prosecution claims are rooted in the Due Process Clause and prohibit a 
prosecution initiated in retaliation for the defendant exercising a protected constitutional or 
statutory right.  See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is an 
elementary violation of due process for a prosecutor to engage in conduct detrimental to a 
criminal defendant for the vindictive purpose of penalizing the defendant for exercising his 
constitutional right at trial.”).  Proof of vindictiveness requires some showing that the 
prosecutor harbored genuine animus towards the defendant.  United States v. Cyprian, 23 
F.3d 1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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officer.  Informing the jury of the government’s Brady misconduct makes 
the defendant’s other allegations of improper conduct more credible. 
B.  POTENTIAL EXCLUSION OF BRADY MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE AS 
“UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL” 
Even if a trial judge finds that Brady misconduct evidence is relevant 
under the evidentiary rules, the court can still exclude the evidence upon 
finding that it is unfairly prejudicial or would cause an unreasonable 
disruption in the trial.  Specifically, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”186 
In applying the probative/prejudicial analysis, trial courts are cautioned 
to “distinguish between prejudice resulting from the reasonable persuasive 
force of evidence and prejudice resulting from excessive emotional or 
irrational effects that could distort the accuracy and integrity of the 
factfinding process.”187  In Old Chief v. United States, the Court stated that 
unfair prejudice means “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”188  
Accordingly, state and federal courts commonly exercise their discretionary 
authority to exclude evidence that “evokes the anger or punitive impulses of 
the jury, unfairly puts a party or witness in a negative light, appeals to the 
jury’s prejudices, or gives rise to overly strong sympathetic reactions.”189 
Applying the unfair prejudice standard to Brady misconduct evidence, 
a trial judge could exclude facts related to the government’s intentional 
Brady misconduct upon finding that the evidence will distract the jury from 
its main focus of determining whether the defendant committed the 
crime.190  A trial court could find that any probative value of evidence that 
the government intentionally concealed favorable information from the 
 
186 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
187 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 175 (3d ed. 2003). 
188 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
189 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 187, at 175-80. 
190 United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1982).  The defense argued that an 
effort by the government to influence testimony should be considered by the jury in 
evaluating the merits of the government’s case, and “an inference may be drawn as to the 
weakness of the Government’s case from that conduct.”  Id. at 36.  The court excluded the 
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 finding the evidence was both collateral and 
cumulative.  Id. at 37; see also Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 136 
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (reasoning that informing jury of discovery misconduct may consume jury’s 
attention and divert them away from substantive issues in the case). 
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defense is far outweighed by the risk that jurors might seek to “punish” the 
government and express its moral outrage over the government’s 
misconduct by rendering a verdict favorable to the defense and against the 
weight of the evidence.  The potential for this kind of emotionally charged 
jury nullification is the kind of unfair prejudice that Rule 403 is designed to 
prevent. 
In addition to the impact on the prosecution’s case, Brady misconduct 
evidence could be excluded by the trial judge on the grounds that such 
evidence will unduly extend and complicate the trial, counter to the interests 
in judicial economy and efficiency embodied in Rule 403.  Litigating the 
Brady misconduct issue would involve the presentation of evidence 
regarding when the prosecutor learned of the misconduct, who was 
involved in the “cover-up,” and the steps the prosecutors took to conceal the 
information.  In rebuttal, the prosecution would be entitled to present 
evidence to show that the nondisclosure of Brady evidence was not in bad 
faith, but was the result of carelessness or simple negligence during the 
pretrial case preparation, or the innocent failure of the prosecution team to 
appreciate the exculpatory nature of the evidence.  Presentation of all of 
these facts could create a collateral “mini-trial” involving the direct and 
cross-examination of numerous additional witnesses and hours of additional 
court time.  Accordingly, a trial judge could use Rule 403 to exclude the 
Brady misconduct evidence based on “considerations of undue delay.” 
Despite these concerns and the broad discretionary authority of the 
trial court, evidence of intentional Brady misconduct should not be 
excluded under Rule 403.  As one court has noted, “[t]he fact that 
materially exculpatory evidence may complicate a trial is no grounds to 
exclude the evidence; some trials are meant to be complicated and juries are 
capable of dealing with factual complexity.” 191 
Moreover, despite the prejudice to the defense, courts routinely allow 
evidence of consciousness of guilt.  Over a century ago, the Supreme Court 
observed that 
there are so many reasons for [consciousness of guilt] conduct, consistent with 
innocence, that it scarcely comes up to the standard of evidence tending to establish 
guilt; but this evidence has been allowed upon the theory that the jury will give it such 
weight as it deserves, depending upon the surrounding circumstances.192 
 
191 Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 122 (D.C. 1996). 
192 Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 417 (1896) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Accordingly, consciousness of guilt evidence is freely admitted regardless 
of whether the defendant has an innocent explanation for the conduct.193  
The defense is simply allowed, in rebuttal, to offer evidence in support of 
an innocent explanation of the defendant’s conduct.194  Any prejudice to the 
defense is deemed sufficiently mitigated by the court giving the jury a 
balanced instruction on the limited value of the evidence in proving guilt 
and telling the jury that there may be innocent explanations for the 
defendant’s conduct.  One standard instruction informs the jury as follows: 
[y]ou have heard evidence suggesting that the defendant may have intentionally tried 
to conceal evidence in this case.  If the Commonwealth has proved that the defendant 
did conceal evidence, you may consider whether such actions indicate feelings of guilt 
by the defendant and whether, in turn, such feelings of guilt might tend to show actual 
guilt . . . .  You are not required to draw such inferences, and you should not do so 
unless they appear to be reasonable in light of all the circumstances of this case.  If 
you decide that such inferences are reasonable, it will be up to you to decide how 
much importance to give them.  But you should always remember that there may be 
numerous reasons why an innocent person might do such things.  Such conduct does 
not necessarily reflect feelings of guilt.  Please also bear in mind that a person having 
feelings of guilt is not necessarily guilty in fact, for such feelings are sometimes found 
in innocent people.  Finally, remember that, standing alone, such evidence is never 
enough by itself to convict a person of a crime.  You may not find the defendant guilty 
on such evidence alone, but you may consider it in your deliberations, along with all 
the other evidence.195 
Likewise, to ameliorate any possible unfair prejudice to the 
government when Brady misconduct evidence is presented, the court should 
take similar precautionary measures.  Specifically, the government should 
be permitted to explain why its conduct, though intentional, does not evince 
consciousness of a weak case.  The jury can then decide what significance, 
if any, the government’s Brady misconduct will have in the case.  The trial 
court can then modify the court’s standard consciousness of guilt 
 
193 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera, 490 N.E.2d 1160, 1163-64 (Mass. 1986); 
Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 452 N.E.2d 1094, 1102-03 (Mass. 1983). 
194 WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 276, at 130 (“[T]he accused may always endeavor to 
destroy the adverse significance of his conduct by facts which indicate it to be equally or 
more consistent with such other hypothesis than that of consciousness of guilt.”); e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Chase, 530 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1988) (“The defendant had an 
unqualified right to negate the inference of consciousness of guilt by explaining [the facts] to 
the jury . . . .”); Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions, Instruction 3.580 n.6 
(2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/jury-
instructions/criminal/. 
195 Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions, supra note 194; see also 
AARONSON, supra note 180, § 2.55(B) (quoting a standard jury instruction as stating, in part: 
“You are free to ignore any evidence that the defendant [concealed] evidence if you decide 
that the conduct was innocent in nature or was not reflective of a consciousness of guilt of 
the crime charged”). 
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instruction to inform the jury of the proper use of the Brady misconduct 
evidence presented by the defense.  In advancing the court’s legitimate 
concerns over judicial economy and “considerations of undue delay,” the 
same skills in courtroom management and discretion used to regulate and 
control the orderly and efficient presentation of consciousness of guilt 
evidence should inform the court’s handling of Brady misconduct evidence. 
Finally, there is no principled reason to shield the government’s 
intentional misconduct from the jury.  The rules of evidence currently 
provide blanket exclusions for certain categories of evidence—settlement 
negotiations, plea discussions, subsequent remedial measures—that 
advance important social policies.196  There are no similar policy 
considerations to justify shielding intentional misconduct by litigants from 
disclosure at trial.  In fact, existing evidence exclusionary rules do not 
exclude evidence of misconduct by a litigant.197  Just as the evidentiary 
rules do not provide a shield for either the defendant who seeks to hide 
incriminating evidence or other civil and criminal litigants who engage in 
obstructionist behavior, the rules should not shield the government’s 
intentional Brady misconduct when legitimately offered by the defense to 
prove the government’s case is too weak to establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
C.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
In addition to meeting evidentiary admissibility standards, the right of 
a criminal defendant to present evidence of intentional Brady misconduct in 
support of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference is firmly grounded 
in the constitutional right to present a defense.  Although the Constitution 
does not expressly state that criminal defendants have a right to present a 
 
196 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (providing that evidence that a party took remedial steps 
or “subsequent remedial measures” after an accident to ameliorate the cause of the accident 
and prevent further injuries is not admissible to prove liability); FED. R. EVID. 408 (providing 
that statements made by parties during the course of settlement negotiations are generally not 
admissible at trial to prove liability); FED. R. EVID. 409 (providing that “good Samaritan” 
offers to pay medical expenses out of compassion are not admissible to prove liability); FED. 
R. EVID. 410 (providing that statements made during plea negotiations are generally 
excluded during trial to prove guilt).  See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
187, at 231-63. 
197 While Federal Rule of Evidence 408 generally excludes offers to compromise and 
statements made during settlement negotiations, the rule expressly allows evidence offered 
to prove “an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”  FED. R. EVID. 
408(b); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 187, at 246.  Likewise, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 410 generally excludes statements made by the defendant during plea 
negotiations but does not prohibit the admissibility of certain sworn statements of the 
defendant when offered against the defendant “in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false 
statement.”  FED. R. EVID. 410. 
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defense, the Supreme Court has long recognized that criminal courts cannot 
deny defendants the opportunity to adduce relevant evidence to either 
establish their innocence or challenge the government’s case.  The Court 
has stated that the constitutional right to present a defense is grounded in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory 
Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.198  The right 
has been described as “the right to present the defendant’s version of the 
facts”199 and the defendant’s basic right to “have the prosecutor’s case 
encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’”200  
While state and federal rule makers can adopt rules that restrict or exclude 
evidence from criminal trials,201 the Court has stated that the defendant’s 
right to present a defense is violated when the rigid application of such 
evidentiary rules precludes the defense from presenting probative 
exculpatory evidence.      
In Chambers v. Mississippi,202 hearsay rules and the common law 
“voucher rule,” which barred a litigant from impeaching his own witness, 
were used to prevent the defense from presenting testimony that a hostile 
witness had previously confessed to the very crime the defendant was 
charged with committing.  The Court found that “where constitutional 
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the 
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanically to defeat the ends of 
justice.”203  Similarly, in Crane v. Kentucky,204 the Court found that the 
right to present a defense was violated by a state court evidence rule that 
prevented the defendant from presenting evidence to show that the police 
coerced his confession.  In the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the 
right to present a defense, Holmes v. South Carolina,205 the Court found 
unconstitutional a state court rule that allowed a trial court to bar the 
defense from presenting evidence that a third party actually committed the 
 
198 Id. at 690. (“Whether rooted in, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment the 
Constitution guarantees defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.”) (citations omitted); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
§§ 2.1-2.6 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: 
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711 (1976). 
199 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 423 (1988) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 19 (1967)). 
200 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986). 
201 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (citing United States v. Scheffer, 
523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). 
202 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). 
203 Id. at 302. 
204 Crane, 476 U.S. at 687. 
205 Holmes, 547 U.S. 319. 
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crime if the trial judge determined that the government had already adduced 
strong evidence of guilt. 
The Supreme Court has also found that the right to present a defense is 
violated by the arbitrary application of state court rules that prevent the 
presentation of certain evidence by the defense but impose no 
corresponding restriction on the government’s ability to present the same 
type of evidence.  In Washington v. Texas,206 the Court found 
unconstitutional a Texas statute that barred the defense from presenting the 
exculpatory testimony of an accomplice but did not prohibit the accomplice 
from giving inculpatory testimony for the prosecution.  In finding that this 
uneven and arbitrary evidentiary rule violated due process, the Court noted 
that the state had no legitimate reason for the double standard.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Harlan also condemned the Texas evidence rule for its 
“discrimination between the prosecution and the defense.”207 
The right to present a defense does not, however, give the accused an 
unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or 
otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.  The Court, in 
Illinois v. Taylor, stated that “[t]he adversary process could not function 
effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly 
presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair 
opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponent’s case.”208  When the defendant’s right to present exculpatory 
evidence conflicts with evidence rules, the court must balance these 
competing interests to determine whether those advanced by exclusion of 
the evidence must yield to the defendant’s rights.  Several provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence recognize this delicate balance and expressly 
make exclusionary rules subject to the defendant’s constitutional right to 
present a defense.209 
 
206 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
207 Id. at 17 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
208 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1988). 
209 For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence generally exclude impeachment with 
juvenile adjudications but permit its use if required for “a fair determination of the issue of 
guilt or innocence.”  FED. R. EVID. 609(d).  In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974), the 
Court held that the state’s interest in protecting juvenile records could not be used to prevent 
the defendant from impeaching a key government witness based on bias.  The Court 
recognized that the state’s interest “must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the 
truth in the process of defending himself.”  Id.  Likewise, the “rape shield” provision of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence generally precludes criminal defendants from introducing 
evidence concerning a rape complainant’s sexual history or predisposition but allows such 
evidence if “exclusion . . . would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 412(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396 (W.D.N.C. 1991) 
(finding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense necessitated the 
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Against this backdrop, blanket exclusion of Brady misconduct 
evidence when offered by the defense to support the “consciousness of a 
weak case” inference would violate the defendant’s right to present a 
defense.  Any rule that would preclude the defendant from offering 
evidence of the government’s intentional suppression of evidence while 
freely allowing the government to introduce evidence of the defendant’s 
acts of evidence suppression to show consciousness of guilt would 
constitute the very kind of arbitrary and uneven application of the rules of 
evidence struck down by the court in Washington v. Texas over forty years 
ago, especially when there are no compelling policy reasons to justify 
exclusion of this evidence. 210   
In sum, Brady misconduct evidence is admissible under the rules of 
evidence because intentional Brady violations give rise to the well-
established “consciousness of a weak case” inference.  Not only is Brady 
misconduct evidence relevant to whether the government’s case is strong 
enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such evidence is 
particularly probative when the defense challenges the integrity of the 
government’s investigation and when the defense claims that the 
prosecution is tainted by government bias or ill will toward the defendant.  
Brady misconduct evidence is also admissible over an “unfair prejudice” 
objection.  Just as courts have developed safeguards to prevent any unfair 
prejudice to the defendant from the admission of consciousness of guilt 
evidence, trial judges can use similar measures to prevent Brady 
misconduct evidence from causing unfair prejudice to the government’s 
case.  Finally, prohibiting the defense from presenting evidence of the 
government’s intentional acts of evidence suppression would run afoul of 
the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, especially when 
evidence rules liberally allow the prosecution to present such evidence 
against the defense. 
V.  THE CASE OF ARNELL SHELTON 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion in United States v. 
Shelton211 is perhaps the first (and only) post-Brady case to apply the 
 
presentation of evidence of complainant’s previous allegations of sexual misconduct against 
three other men). 
210 E.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 120 (D.C. 2003) (“The language of the 
party admissions rule provides no basis for creating a prosecutorial exception or an 
exception where the government is the party opponent.  Such an exception . . . is unfair in 
light of the applicability of the party admissions rule to criminal defendants.”); People v. 
Hall, 12 N.W. 665, 668 (Mich. 1882) (stating that “[t]here is no more reason for exempting 
the prosecution than the defence [sic] from scrutiny concerning tampering with witnesses” 
where government tried to induce witnesses to suppress testimony). 
211 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009). 
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“consciousness of a weak case” inference to intentional Brady misconduct.  
As discussed in more detail below, Shelton serves as a good vehicle to 
illustrate the application of the Brady instruction and the “consciousness of 
a weak case” inference. 
A.  THE FACTS 
Arnell Shelton was tried in the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia for assault with intent to kill and other charges related to the 
shooting of Christopher Boyd.212  According to the government, while Boyd 
was double parked in his car, Shelton arrived on the scene in another 
vehicle and fired several shots at Boyd, hitting Boyd in his back.  
Remarkably, Boyd sped away and drove himself to a nearby hospital.  The 
identity of the shooter was the central disputed issue at trial.  To prove that 
Shelton was the shooter, the government relied primarily on Boyd’s 
testimony that he knew Shelton before the shooting and recognized Shelton 
as the person who shot him.  Boyd also testified that Shelton’s possible 
motive to shoot him was a prior “beef” between them.213  For the defense, 
Shelton’s wife testified that Shelton was at home on the night of the 
shooting.  The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict at the 
conclusion of the first trial, and the judge declared a mistrial.214 
On the eve of the retrial, Shelton’s defense attorney was contacted by 
the new prosecutor assigned to the case who reported that there was 
“potential Brady” information that had not been disclosed to the defense.215  
Specifically, the new prosecutor disclosed that Officer Woodward, the first 
police officer assigned to investigate the shooting, spoke briefly to Boyd at 
the hospital before he went in for surgery.  Officer Woodward asked Boyd 
if he knew the identity of the person who shot him, and Boyd responded in 
the negative, stating either that he did not know or did not see who shot 
him.  Boyd’s hospital statement was memorialized in Officer Woodward’s 
notes and in Woodward’s grand jury testimony.216  Despite defense 
counsel’s Brady request prior to the first trial, the original trial prosecutor 
never informed the defense of Boyd’s hospital statement. 
 
212 Id. at 364. 
213 Prior to the shooting, Boyd testified that he informed his cousin that Shelton had 
made unwanted sexual advances towards his cousin’s sister.  Boyd testified that he was 
present when his cousin confronted Shelton on the street and the retaliatory confrontation led 
to his cousin assaulting Shelton and causing major damage to Shelton’s car.  Id. at 365-66. 
214 Id. at 364 n.6. 
215 Transcript of Pretrial Hearing re Brady Disclosure at 13, United States v. Shelton, No. 
F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 18, 2002) (on file with author). 
216 Id. at 15; Brief for Appellee at 11, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007) (on file with author). 
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Defense counsel informed the trial judge of the new prosecutor’s last-
minute disclosure of Brady information and moved to dismiss all charges 
with prejudice.  The trial judge delayed the start of the trial until the next 
day to give the defense an opportunity to investigate the Brady information 
and the circumstances surrounding its nondisclosure.  The following day, 
the prosecutor candidly admitted in court that the original prosecutor (Mr. 
Kline) was aware of Boyd’s hospital statement prior to the first trial.  When 
asked by the trial judge why Mr. Kline failed to disclose the statement to 
the defense, the prosecutor stated: 
[i]t was Mr. Kline’s position that the information was not exculpatory. . . .  My 
understanding is that Mr. Kline’s position was based on the thought that there was a 
reason for the witness to respond in that way.  The reason being that the witness was 
in pain.  He had just been taken to the hospital.  He was on a gurney, staff attending to 
him, etc.217 
In response, the trial judge stated: 
given the prosecutor’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland, I don’t see how the 
prosecutor who states that if a witness says I don’t know who shot me or I did not see 
who shot me or all I saw was a dark car, who’s later going to come into court and say 
Arnell Shelton shot me, I saw it, saw him, and should not turn that over because the 
prosecutor doesn’t think it true. . . .  I don’t see how any prosecutor anywhere in any 
state in the country could say I don’t have to turn that over because I think I know 
why he said that.218 
Thereafter, the trial judge offered (and the defense declined) a 
continuance of the trial date and denied the defense motion to dismiss. 
During the second trial, Boyd identified Shelton as the shooter, and the 
defense then called Officer Woodward to testify to Boyd’s hospital 
statement.  The defense then attempted to elicit from Officer Woodward the 
fact that Boyd’s hospital statement was withheld by the government prior to 
the first trial.  The government objected on relevance grounds.  The court 
sustained the objection and stated to defense counsel: “I don’t want you 
[going] into what he told Mr. Kline, why Mr. Kline didn’t tell you, the 
jury’s not going to hear that.”219  The defense attorney explained that her 
purpose in eliciting testimony regarding the Brady violation was to show 
that the government was “playing dirty.”  The trial judge stated that the sole 
remedy for the Brady violation was the offer of a continuance.  The judge 
informed defense counsel that “there’s no other sanction you’re going to 
get.”220 
 
217 Shelton, 983 A.2d at 367. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 368. 
220 Id. 
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At the close of the evidence, Arnell Shelton was convicted on all 
counts.  Shelton argued on appeal that the trial court erred in precluding the 
defense from introducing the facts surrounding the Brady violation to 
support a “consciousness of a weak case” inference.221  The appellate court 
agreed, holding that “defense counsel had a basis in law to argue that the 
government’s nondisclosure of exculpatory information was akin to an 
admission by conduct that the government was conscious that its case was 
weak (and that it was in fact weak) and that appellant should have been 
allowed to present that evidence.”222 
B.  ANALYSIS 
Although the opinion in Shelton should be lauded for its clarity in 
articulating the clear nexus between intentional Brady violations and the 
“consciousness of a weak case” inference,223 the opinion does not provide 
any guidance to trial courts on sanctions to be imposed when confronted 
with these kinds of intentional Brady violations.  The Brady violation in 
Shelton was intentional.  The facts clearly indicate that the prosecutor was 
well aware of the statement prior to the first trial, and the prosecutor’s 
stated belief that disclosure was not required demonstrates that the 
withholding of the statement was a deliberate decision.224  Notwithstanding, 
no sanction was imposed by the trial court.  The only “sanction” the trial 
court purported to impose was a continuance of the trial date.  This, of 
course, was not actually a sanction against the government.  Given the 
government’s blatant Brady violation, a Brady instruction would have been 
an effective and appropriate sanction.  Consistent with the instruction 
proposed above in Part III, the trial judge could have instructed the jury as 
follows: 
 
221 Id. at 369. 
222 Id. at 371. 
223 The court in Shelton recognized that the Brady disclosure duty is breached whether 
nondisclosure is negligent or intentional but correctly noted that only an intentional 
suppression of Brady information will give rise to the inference that the government 
considered that disclosure of the evidence would weaken its case.  Id. at 372 n.19. 
224 Also, contrary to the prosecutor’s dubious contention that he believed Boyd’s 
statement was not credible because Boyd was injured and in pain when the statement was 
made, these extreme circumstances surrounding the making of the statement would make the 
statement more—not less—credible under traditional rules of evidence.  As the statement 
was made shortly after Boyd was shot and related to the circumstances surrounding the 
shooting (the identity of the shooter), the statement would likely be deemed sufficiently 
reliable to be admissible as an “excited utterance” under either the federal or the District of 
Columbia rules of evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a] 
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition”); Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 
1219 (D.C. 1988) (noting the same).  
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[u]nder the United States Constitution, in order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, 
the government is required to inform the defense of any information known to the 
government that tends to suggest that the defendant might not have committed the 
crime(s) charged, as well as information which casts doubt on the credibility of the 
government’s own evidence.  In this case, the government intentionally withheld such 
evidence from the defense.  Specifically, the government failed to inform the defense 
that shortly after he was shot, Mr. Boyd informed the police that he could not identify 
the person who shot him.  In evaluating the merits of this case, you can decide what 
weight, if any, to give to the government’s misconduct.  The government’s actions, 
standing alone, or in combination with other facts presented in this case, may create a 
reasonable doubt in your mind about the defendant’s guilt. 
In addition, the decision in Shelton fell short in finding that the trial 
court’s error in precluding the defense from presenting Brady misconduct 
evidence was harmless.  The Shelton court failed to fully appreciate the rich 
evidentiary value of Brady misconduct evidence and the persuasive force of 
the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.225  In the hands of a skilled 
 
225 The government’s evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.  There was no gun or 
other physical evidence to link Shelton to the crime scene.  The entire case rested largely on 
the strength of Boyd’s identification of Shelton as the shooter.  In support of its conclusion 
that Shelton was not prejudiced by the trial court’s error, the Shelton court stated that Officer 
Woodward’s testimony regarding the hospital statement was “ambiguous” and “did not have 
much force.”  Shelton, 983 A.2d at 372.  In fact, the only ambiguity was whether Boyd told 
Woodward: “I did not see who shot me,” or whether Boyd said: “I don’t know who shot 
me.”  Under either version, Boyd told Officer Woodward that he could not identify the 
shooter.  In addition, Officer Woodward—not Boyd—first mentioned Shelton’s name as the 
possible shooter when he interviewed Boyd.  Id. at 366.  Before traveling to the hospital to 
interview Boyd, Boyd’s mother told Woodward about the prior beef between Boyd and 
Shelton.  Brief for Appellee, supra note 216, at 16; Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Shelton v. 
United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2006); see also Transcript of Jury Trial 
at 225-30, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 2002).  Even 
then Boyd did not name Shelton as the shooter.  Id.  In addition, Boyd testified that when he 
spoke to Woodward he was “in and out of consciousness” and “didn’t really know what was 
going on at the time.”  Shelton, 983 A.2d at 365.  However, Officer Woodward testified that 
when he arrived at the hospital to speak to Boyd, though Boyd appeared to be in obvious 
pain from his gunshot wound, Boyd was very much conscious, awake, and alert.  Transcript 
of Jury Trial, supra, at 229.  Woodward’s testimony on this point was bolstered by Boyd’s 
hospital records (introduced by the defense), which reported that Boyd was alert although 
“anxious” and in “moderate pain.”  Brief of Appellant supra, at 12; see also Transcript of 
Jury Trial at 351, 362, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 
2002).  The Shelton court also stated that Boyd’s eyewitness identification was corroborated 
by another witness, Andrew Durham, who was “not significantly impeached.”  Id. at 373.  
However, Durham was impeached with two different pretrial statements wherein he stated 
that he did not know the shooter.  Durham was also impeached with the fact that during a 
pretrial meeting with detectives when he was shown a photograph of Shelton, Durham stated 
that the photograph did not look anything like the shooter.  Transcript of Jury Trial (July 23, 
2002), supra, at 208, 168, 196, 205; Brief of Appellant, supra, at 10-12.  The defense also 
impeached Durham with the fact that he only stated that he could identify Shelton as the 
shooter after Durham was incarcerated and facing his own criminal charges.  Thus, Boyd’s 
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criminal defense attorney, the government’s Brady misconduct could 
illuminate the overall weaknesses in the government’s case and explain the 
strong connection between the government’s misconduct and the 
government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  For 
example, the defense could have argued the following: 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury: 
Actions speak louder than words.  By their actions—hiding and concealing key 
evidence—the government is sending you a message: they cannot prove that Mr. 
Shelton committed this crime.  Mr. Boyd, the government’s key witness, told the 
police that he did not know who shot him and he could not identify the shooter.  Plain 
and simple: the government’s case is weak.  They know it, and now you know it, too. 
This case is not about the evidence the government showed you, it’s about the 
evidence they tried to hide from you.  The evidence they never wanted you to hear.  
The prosecution knew you would never believe Mr. Boyd if you knew the that the 
story Mr. Boyd is saying now is completely different from what he reported to the 
police at the hospital right after he was shot.  This is the truth the government tried to 
hide.  These are the facts they did not want you to know.     
Ask yourself: if the government had a solid case against Mr. Shelton, why would they 
stoop so low as to violate the law by purposely hiding this critical piece of evidence?  
They wouldn’t.  They would have no reason to.  Hiding evidence is an act of 
desperation.  The government wants to win at all costs—even if they have to cheat to 
do it.  By their underhanded actions, the government is telling you that their case is 
weak.  And we hear them loud and clear.   
Ladies and Gentlemen, after all they did and all they hid, how could you not have a 
reasonable doubt in this case?   
Having admitted on the record that nondisclosure of the hospital 
statement was not accidental, the government would have been hard-
pressed to proffer a credible explanation to rebut the “consciousness of a 
weak case” inference argued by the defense.  Because the trial court 
precluded the Brady misconduct evidence needed to support the 
“consciousness of a weak case” inference, the defense in Shelton was 
unable to attack the heart of the government’s case and reap the full benefit 
of this valuable argument on reasonable doubt. 
VI:  CONCLUSION 
The magnitude of Brady misconduct in the American criminal justice 
system is reflected in the number of wrongful convictions, near executions, 
and other miscarriages of justice in state and federal courtrooms across the 
country.  These violations infect the accuracy of the fact-finding process 
and undermine the overall integrity of the judicial system.  Prosecutors have 
 
identification was not bolstered by other compelling evidence presented by the government 
at trial. 
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not performed well as the stewards of exculpatory evidence but have 
remained steadfast in their resistance to any external restrictions on their 
ability to control whether and when Brady evidence is disclosed to the 
defense.  As both Stevens and Shelton make plain, the status quo is 
dysfunctional.  In seeking to improve the management and delivery of 
Brady evidence, criminal courts should take a serious look at two well-worn 
civil practices that allow litigants to introduce discovery misconduct 
evidence at trial, either as a court-imposed sanction or as relevant evidence 
of the weakness of a litigant’s case.  Unlike other Brady reform proposals, 
both these measures can be fully implemented by trial courts within the 
framework of existing law and could prompt prosecutors to begin 
systematically disclosing all material exculpatory evidence to the defense as 
envisioned by the Supreme Court over forty-five years ago in Brady v. 
Maryland. 
 
